

\$6 a Copy

No Advertising

\$7 a Year

American
Leg Library
Big Sandy, TX 75755

BLUE MOUNTAIN COLLEGE LIBRARY

AUG 25 1993

Current History

REFS 7-7-55
1
5-60 MOUNTAIN MISS
CHUBER LIBRARY MOUNTAIN MISS
BLUE MOUNTAIN LIBRARY

FEBRUARY, 1960

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

The Nations of Southeast Asia

CHINESE-INDIAN COMPETITION IN ASIA	<i>Werner Levi</i>	65
LAOS: PAWN IN POWER POLITICS	<i>Thomas E. Ennis</i>	70
BURMA'S MILITARY REGIME	<i>John F. Cady</i>	75
THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO MALAYA AND SINGAPORE		
	<i>Gerald P. Dartford</i>	82
INDONESIA IN THE COLD WAR	<i>Justus M. van der Kroef</i>	88
SEATO AND PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	<i>Norman J. Padelford</i>	95
COMMUNIST PRESSURES IN THAILAND	<i>Edwin F. Stanton</i>	102
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK		110

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Antarctica Pact	113
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	117

Current History

**Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times**

**Published by
Current History, Inc.**

**Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND**

FEBRUARY, 1960
Volume 38 Number 222

**Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.**

**Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON**

**Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON**

**Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN**

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

ALZADA COMSTOCK
Mt. Holyoke College

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

85 cents a copy; 7 dollars a year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-five cents a year. Foreign including the Philippines 7 dollars eighty-five cents a year.

Coming Next Month...

LATIN AMERICA IN REVOLUTION

March, 1960

Our March, 1960, issue wrestles with the problems facing the nations of Latin America. Particular attention is drawn to the underlying economic and historical causes of unrest in the following seven articles:

BOLIVIA by *C. A. Hauberg*, Associate Professor of History, St. Olaf College;

BRAZIL by *John J. Johnson*, Professor of History, Stanford University, and author of *Political Change in Latin America*;

ARGENTINA by *Robert J. Alexander*, Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, and author of *Communism in Latin America*;

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC by *Hubert Herr-ing*, Professor of Latin American Civilization, Claremont Graduate College and Pomona College, and author of *A History of Latin America*;

VENEZUELA by *W. Donald Beatty*, Professor of History, University of Minnesota;

CUBA by *Harry B. Murkland*, Hemisphere Affairs Editor of *Newsweek*; and

MEXICO by *Stanley R. Ross*, Department of History, University of Nebraska, and author of *Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy*.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1960, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 38

February, 1960

No. 222

Continuing our study of fifteen years of East-West tension, this issue examines the cold war as it is reflected in the policies and programs of the states of South-east Asia. What is Southeast Asia's role in the cold war? In the introductory article, Werner Levi elaborates this crucial question in the light of the Chinese-Indian conflict.

Chinese-Indian Competition in Asia

By WERNER LEVI

Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

THE "AREA of peace" Jawaharlal Nehru so ardently desired for his India has been disturbed. To establish and maintain it, he often severely criticized his friends in the West and spoke softly to his antagonists in the East. Still, not the Western system of defensive alliances, that he feared, but the aggressiveness of a fellow Asian nation, in which he disbelieved, is threatening to ruin his success in foreign affairs.

China's recent actions along the Himalayan borders did not come entirely as a surprise to India. By warning China when she "liberated" Tibet in the fall of 1950 that any expansion beyond Tibet's traditional borders would touch upon vital Indian interests, Nehru envisaged the possibility of aggression. He began to prepare for it, even while pursuing the most conciliatory policy toward his big neighbor. The tribes of Assam were denied the autonomy they were clamoring for because their area was of too great a strategic significance for India. Bhutan was advised—until the middle of 1959—to keep herself inaccessible and in complete isolation as the best defense for herself and India. The passes and trade routes between India and Tibet via Sikkim were carefully checked and guarded.

Along the northern borders of Nepal, Indian military missions helped to establish and

fortify checkposts and to train the Nepalese army. Strategic roads were built toward Ladakh to make the frontier with China more easily accessible to Indian troops. The majority of the Indian army was trained in the Himalayas for mountain warfare. But as the Prime Minister admitted, many of these preparations were inadequate; the development of communications especially was too slow and "a bad show." The Chinese found many weak spots along the border.

Quite apart from technical difficulties and administrative inefficiency that slowed defense preparations, the government preferred to put the main emphasis on defense by diplomacy, but had doubtful success with the Chinese here too. Its main weakness has been to ignore the long-range intent of China's leaders and to misinterpret the meaning of their strategy and tactics. Fundamentally, the immediate Chinese goals and procedures have been very simple: to expand their influence and accumulate power step by step, carefully consolidating each gain. In Nehru's eyes, each of these steps in itself, usually of relatively minor consequence, was explicable, if not excusable, against the background of Chinese history, Chinese national interests and the flush of revolutionary victory. None of them seemed serious enough basically to affect the good relations which he

wishfully thought existed between China and his country. The Chinese, cleverly exploiting Nehru's willingness to understand and forgive, covered their actions with protestations of love and a search for peace. Nehru's trust in the *Panch Shila*—the five principles of peaceful coexistence—was thereby reinforced. As far as the Chinese were concerned, however, these turned out to be the diplomatic device for distracting attention from the developing pattern of Chinese actions in the last ten years.

In the Himalayan region, this pattern began with the establishment of Chinese rule over Tibet in 1950. India protested the manner in which this was done, which did not disturb China in the least. Tibet was eliminated as the buffer state which permitted the much vaunted 2000 years of friendship between the two neighbors. Special trading and residence rights, to which India had succeeded when power was transferred from Britain, were abolished. The Indian-Chinese Treaty of 1954 confirmed this new equal arrangement and established the *Panch Shila* as the basis of future relations. India's loss of rights was rationalized on the ground that these rights had been the fruits of British imperialism. But the Indians still insisted on the McMahon line, drawn by the British, as the definitive border between India and China in India's northeast corner. Perhaps further to prove that all was forgiven and forgotten, Nehru went out of his way to present Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister, to the assembled delegates of the Afro-Asian nations at Bandung in 1955 and did his best to raise China's prestige there.

The Chinese accepted all these gestures of friendship. They served as an encouragement to proceed with their over-all plans for expansion in South and Southeast Asia without interruption, though with caution. With China's indispensable aid, Ho Chih-minh conquered half of Indochina for the Communists. China exerted direct pressure upon Burma to "adjust" the border in accordance with maps showing Burmese territory as Chinese. This pressure has never been relaxed and is a source of continuous insecurity to the Burmese. The border region further west, from Assam to Kashmir, remained undisturbed for several years, evidently because

it took time to prepare bases in the Himalayas. Chou En-lai, coldly and conscious of his present superiority, stated quite bluntly that the reason why in the past he had not discussed the border with India was that the conditions for its regulation were not yet ripe. In the meantime China made them ripe by constructing airfields in the Himalayas, building roads along the McMahon line and along the Nepalese border, and opening supply routes between the border and Lhasa and southeastern China.

Trouble on India's Border

Long before the completion of these preparations, the offensive of subversion and diplomatic pressure against Nepal began. Infiltration and Communist propaganda were important especially in northern Nepal, where the population has bonds with Tibet. Here and there, revolts broke out among the peasants, with the leaders always finding easy refuge across the border. Nepal's reluctance to allow Chinese diplomats into the country was finally broken down by Chinese pressure and Indian urging.

That all these activities along the border had a deeper meaning was made evident, at least to officials who knew the facts, by border crossings in many places, beginning in 1954, and by the use of maps in China showing territories in Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and India as Chinese. Indian protests were answered with vague excuses that Nationalist Chinese maps had not yet been replaced. Early in 1959, at last, the Chinese Communists admitted openly that they disagreed with India on the delineation of the border and to prove their point they made deep incursions into territory which India considers hers.

It appears evident that the border crossings since 1954 were probes to test Indian reaction. On every occasion the Indian government protested but withheld the events from public knowledge "in the hope that peaceful solutions to the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides." Since these paper protests were accompanied by continued Indian championing of China's causes on the world scene, the Chinese interpreted this Indian restraint and good will as weakness. Finally, in the summer of 1959, they expanded their border crossings into

occupation of territory in the North East Frontier Agency and in Ladakh and, as Indian resistance failed to materialize, claimed increasingly more territory.

These blatant actions could no longer be hidden from the Indian public. Small popular demonstrations, sharp newspaper editorials, critical statements by political parties, including the Communists, calls for resistance in the Indian Parliament, indicated the prevailing mood. Nehru, himself an object of criticism when the inadequacy of defense measures became evident, could no longer ignore the situation. With obvious reluctance he began to make strong statements about resistance to further Chinese encroachments, but at the same time weakened them with the question: "What do you want me to do, what do you want me to do?" He now admitted (in October, 1959), that the Chinese incursions into India were part of "a deliberate program of aggression." But what India could do about it, he was not sure, except that pride and prestige would prevent her from calling for help from friends. The Chinese, in the meantime, continued their tactics of clothing every act of aggression in confessions of warm friendship for their victim. They were even willing to negotiate, if they could get what they wanted, and if India would stop attacking their outposts!

A high point in Chinese cynicism was reached early in November, when (having penetrated from 40 to 60 miles into Ladakh) Peking proposed that each side should withdraw its armed forces 12.5 miles from the McMahon Line and, in Ladakh, from the line up to which each side exercised actual control. This offer meant not merely that the Chinese would retain control of most of the territory in dispute, but that the Indians would have to abandon the only small air-strip in Ladakh and resettle their outposts in almost inaccessible terrain. If the Indians would do this, the Chinese would then be willing to discuss the whole Indian-Chinese border line—would, in other words, open up a question which to the Indians is no question at all. The Chinese supplemented this "offer" with the open threat of putting pressure on the McMahon line if the Indians would not surrender in Ladakh—indicating that they are more interested in territorial

acquisitions there than in the northeast of India and exploiting earlier hints by Nehru that he was not much interested in Ladakh.

The puzzle is why the Chinese have chosen to antagonize the best friends they have in the free world with the conquest of territory which, in Premier Khrushchev's words, is unpopulated and of no strategic significance in the modern world. Of the several answers that might be given, none is certain, and some are more likely correct than others. The view of some Indians that China wants to revenge herself for India's giving refuge to the Dalai Lama or for New Delhi forcing the Communist government in Kerala out of office is not very convincing because the border troubles began in 1954, not in 1959. For the same reason, Chinese actions can hardly be construed as an attempt to spoil the improvement in American Russian relations. While it is presumably true that Russia's neutral attitude in the dispute and Khrushchev's warning in Peking not to test the weakness of capitalism with aggressive action indicate displeasure with China's Himalayan enterprise, it is also true that it was the Soviet ambassador in Peking who initiated the recent Communist attacks against Nehru in November, 1958. More likely, the Chinese wish to demonstrate that there are problems in the world which cannot be settled at a summit meeting without China.

More convincing is the argument that China's actions are part of her competition with India for leadership of the Asian nations. India has established her prominent position and has acquired a following on the basis of neutralist policy. If China could force her out of this position, she would demonstrate the futility of neutralism and Chinese superiority. This would presumably lead the smaller Asian nations to abandon neutrality and swing toward China. So far, however, China's policy has had the opposite result; it has antagonized and worried the smaller states in the Himalayan area and shocked all others. There is no foretelling, of course, whether in the long run Chinese policy may have the described result.

The most plausible explanation of China's behavior is that she is pursuing traditional policy. The Communist regime is attempting to realize the ambition inspiring all

Chinese regimes since modern contact with the West: to restore the borders of the old empire. Nehru's pessimism regarding China's willingness to abandon any conquered territory is perhaps based on this view. According to this theory, China's Himalayan policy coordinates neatly with the quest for predominant influence in Korea and Indochina, the establishment of control over Tibet, the fortification of rule over Sinkiang, and threats to integrate parts or all of Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh into the Empire in the name of uniting all Mongolian and Mongoloid peoples within the Chinese family.

Why India Hesitates

The other, not much more easily answerable question, is how the hesitant Indian policy can be explained. The most obvious answer is that India is unable to offer effective military resistance. China has three or more million men under arms; India has an army of about one half million men. A sudden enlargement of the Indian army, even were it feasible, would certainly put India behind in economic competition with China and the final outcome in the economic area is more likely to determine who will be the leader in Asia than any military contest short of all-out war. The Chinese are furthermore favored by the easier accessibility of the border regions on their side. Their disadvantage of longer supply lines has been partially compensated for by the construction of strategic roads and airstrips—a measure sadly neglected by the Indians. India now pays for this omission by having to supply some of the outposts in Ladakh by mules, requiring a three day march from the nearest base.

Economic considerations cannot by themselves explain India's military weakness, nor can Nehru's occasional references in the past to the unimportance and uselessness of the Ladakh territory now occupied by the Chinese. Nehru's politics and mentality have a good deal to do with it also. He seems to have found it difficult to believe that modern armies can overcome the barrier represented by the Himalayas. He may have thought that China would therefore have no practical alternative to the *Panch Shila* and peaceful relations between the two neighbors would


be almost inevitable. Here seemed to be an area in which Nehru's strong convictions about the usefulness of direct negotiations in an atmosphere of reasonableness and peace could find expression and evidence. Supplementing and reinforcing this notion was Nehru's feeling that a fellow Asian nation could not be an imperialist aggressor. With disarming frankness he admitted to his critics that "it did not occur to us that China might resort to aggression." Hence also that undertone of surprise and disbelief in an Indian protest note to China, in which the discovery was disclosed, regretfully, that China's actions were "reminiscent of the activities of the old imperialist powers against whom both India and China struggled in the past."

Unfortunately and very understandably, Nehru's past experience with the "old imperialist powers" continues to affect him sufficiently to make him feel that they remain a greater threat to Asia than any conflict between Asians, or at any rate, that an open dispute among Asians is an undignified spectacle which must never be presented to the West and which would be politically damaging. For the sake of Asian solidarity, he has forever tried to underplay inner Asian frictions and to keep them "within the family." That this evaluation of Asian-Western relations and the political need for One Asia has influenced India's policy in the present situation was evident. On several occasions Nehru remarked that India might have to fight China but that "it would be a tragedy if this kind of thing occurred for our future, for China's future, and for Asia, and this could only benefit those people who are not very friendly to the growth of Asia and Asian nations." In such a frame of mind—and quite apart from other concrete conditions—Nehru might go to great lengths to come to terms with the Chinese. He would find it

(Continued on page 81)

Werner Levi has traveled and lectured on several occasions since World War II in India, Siam, Malaya and Australia. His books include *Free India in Asia*, *Modern China's Foreign Policy*, and most recently, *Australia's Outlook on Asia*.

MAP OF INDIA



Copyright 1959 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass.) from *New Patterns of Democracy in India* by Vera M. Dean.

According to this author's careful examination of recent events, "the future of all Southeast Asia depends upon happenings in Laos. Dire destruction surrounds these peoples, hemmed in by valley and mountain."

Laos: Pawn in Power Politics

By THOMAS E. ENNIS

Professor of Modern European and Asian History, West Virginia University

LAOS, one of the most backward lands on earth, is a constitutional monarchy of 90,000 square miles, hidden in the mountains and jungles of Southeast Asia. Here about 3 million people dwell in villages of thatched-roofed, bamboo homes. There are three races in Laos: the Thai (Lao, Neua, Dam, Deng, Lu), the Indonesians (Lao Theung mountain folk) and the mountaineers (Ho, Yao, Meo) of Chinese origin. There are also about 12,000 Chinese and 15,000 Vietnamese. Most of the inhabitants are Buddhists.

The two largest cities are the royal capital at Luang Prabang (population estimate 10,000) and the administrative center at Vientiane (population 50,000). Vientiane is one of the few official headquarters on the globe noted for lacking a water system, a sewerage disposal and garbage collection. The number of telephones are few and are part of a communication system in almost daily isolation from the outside world. Some 90 per cent of the Laotians, if confronted with a paved road, a radio, a newspaper, an electric light bulb, would be bewildered.

Thomas E. Ennis taught at Yenching University, Peking, from 1924 to 1928. He was formerly manager of the Chung Mei News Agency, 1927, and Assistant Bureau Manager of United Press, Peking, 1927. A Research Consultant with Military Intelligence, General Staff, Washington, D. C., during World War II, he is author of *French Policy and Development in Indochina and Eastern Asia*.

Such is the tiny kingdom of Laos which entered the front pages of the dailies in 1959.

An accord on cessation of hostilities, ending the eight-year war in Indochina, was signed at the Geneva Conference (July 20, 1954) between the commander-in-chief of the troops of the French Union in Indochina and the commander-in-chief of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces (Land of the Lao) and the People's Army of Vietnam, fighters from the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam or the Vietminh. According to this agreement: (1) all Vietminh forces were to withdraw from Laos in 120 days; (2) all French Union troops were to be evacuated within 120 days, except for a maximum of 1,500 officers and n.c.o.'s remaining to train the Royal Laotian Army and a staff of no more than 3,500 to maintain two French military posts; (3) no new troops, staff, arms and munitions were to be introduced; (4) awaiting a political settlement, the combat units of the Pathet Lao were to move to the northeast provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua; (5) an international commission from the United Nations (Canada, India, Poland) was to control and to supervise the operation of the accord.

After many conferences, agreements were signed (November 2, 12, 1957) providing for (1) restoration of the Royal Laotian Government in the two north-east provinces; (2) incorporation of 1,500 "volunteers" from the Pathet Lao forces into the Royal Laotian Army, the rest in the reserve; (3) admittance of members of the Pathet Lao to positions in the royal administration; (4) the change of the Pathet Lao movement into a legally recognized political party, the Neo

Lao Hak Sat (Laotian Patriotic Front); (5) admission of two members of the former Pathet Lao to cabinet posts in a "Government of National Union" (November 19, 1957).

The Seeds of Conflict

In the first general elections held in Laos (1957) one-third of the seats in the National Assembly were won by members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat party. Members were unable to take their seats when the Premier, Phoui Sananikone, abruptly suspended the Assembly (December, 1957), disturbed by the growing strength of the Communists. The new National Assembly voted to give the Premier authority to carry out extensive reforms in the rural areas in order to weaken Communist influence (January 14, 1959). The only votes cast against the Premier came from members of the Communist-front parties, the Neo Lao Hak Sat and the Santiphap (Neutrality party).

Prince Souphanou Vong, leader of the Neo Lao Hak Sat, half-brother of the Premier, accused the Assembly of plotting to destroy his party. He threatened to use force in order to survive. Some of the Neo Lao Hak Sats fled to North Vietnam and the prince was arrested for his rebellious conduct.

Tension increased when demonstrations by the Communist troops of North Vietnam (January, 1959), on the eastern borders of Laos proved to the government that every loyal Laotian would be needed to combat those allied in thought and action to the North Vietnamese regime of Ho Chi-minh. The Western world was unaware of any close links to little Laos until September 30, 1959, when Khamphan Panya, Foreign Minister of Laos, reported to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The minister declared that North Vietnam long had planned to communize his country. He pleaded for United Nations support for his people who were "animated by a sense of humanity and a love of joy and even of the easy life." The hostile groups, he maintained, were mainly Laotian Communists aided by soldiers and arms from North Vietnam. These pro-Communists, the Pathet Lao, were to have been integrated into the Royal Laotian Army, according to the terms of the Geneva accord, but they refused to act

because they were to be used to destroy the Laotian government. The Second Pathet Lao Battalion, in May, 1959, refused to be integrated and marched toward the border of North Vietnam. Since then, this group has received arms and rations from North Vietnam and has arranged to have all wounded flown to North Vietnam hospitals.

"For the attack against the posts of Muong Het and Xieng Kho on August 30, 1959," the Foreign Minister charged, "the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam was not satisfied with furnishing assistance and support. It participated in it in broad daylight. Here is the story as given by people who saw it: 'The attack began at dawn in two successive waves, the first made up of Pathet Lao veterans. The second element did not know how to speak Laotian, but Vietnamese.'"¹

Gathering the Grain

The conflict broke into the open late in July, 1959, when paratroops were dropped to aid the Laotian Army units in Samneua. At the same time, the British Foreign Office supported the accusation of Laos that the rebels "represented new elements entirely armed, equipped and stiffened by the Democratic (Communist) Republic of North Vietnam." The attacks were intensified after an announcement from Paris that Laos had invited "a certain number" of American civilian technicians to work with French military instructors in training the Laotian Army, armed mainly with light weapons. Radio Hanoi stated "American imperialists" were supporting the new advances. It accused the Laotian Army of "terroristic raids." The Laotian government replied that it had documentary proof of intervention of troops from North Vietnam.

General Ouane Rattikone, Laotian Chief of Staff, declared (August, 15) that about 800 guerrillas, trained by North Vietnam, were spreading out to isolate the provinces of Samneua and Phongsaly from the rest of the kingdom.

General Ankhua Soukhavong, North Laos army commander, who has been fighting the Vietminh since 1945, outlined the tactics of the enemy. They usually attacked between midnight and 5:00 A.M., then withdrew, to

¹ *The New York Times*, October 1, 1959.

be replaced by Laotian dissidents. "The Vietminh are behind the tribesmen and Pathet Lao groups, pushing them, trying to make it appear as though this is a civil war." The general emphasized the fact that the only way to block the Communist penetration was to induce the local population to ally itself with the government. If not, "all the soldiers in the world will not keep this province (Samneua) for us." The people must be armed, paid and fed.

In the assaults of late August, reports detailed the moves of five mixed battalions of Laotian rebels, Black Thai, North Vietnamese tribesmen and regulars. Vietnamese was used as the command language. Arms included 57-millimeter recoilless guns and 80-millimeter mortars, all captured American weapons. There was also heavy bombardment from 125-millimeter cannon, based on North Vietnamese soil. By September, it was believed that 800 to 1,000 square miles of Samneua Province were either held by the rebels or unable to be occupied by royal troops. The Royal Laotian Army used enemy tactics, casting off uniforms and dressing in peasant garb. Hiding their weapons at daybreak, they struck at nightfall, from hidden jungle posts.

Operations spread to South Laos in October, 1959. Rebel bands raided Pakse (population 30,000), largest town in the region, to menace two battalions of the Royal Army. Western observers considered the many sorties more serious than the three-month-old "war" in the north, because of the appearance of Kha tribesmen against royal soldiery. The Khas are a hardy primitive folk, of Malayan extraction, who inhabited all Laos before being pushed southward by Laotians and Thai clans.

The problems encountered when preparing for extensive military action in Laos are many. There are no railroads, few roads and only grass strip air-fields. The jungle and climate prevent large-scale operations. Hanson W. Baldwin, most astute of military historians, thus views the Laotian skirmishes:

The Communists probe weak spots. An exploitation of one such area may lead to the weakening of another area, and the dam may eventually burst. Most important: if the United States does not oppose armed Communist aggression everywhere, it will be hard to draw the

line anywhere. . . . The statements of Peiping and Moscow indicate clearly that Laos has been selected as a testing ground.

This is the international challenge that has to be met. It is a three-fold challenge: to the United States, which has committed itself morally and tacitly to the maintenance of Laos as an independent state; to the Southeast Asia alliance, which is committed by treaty protocol to the defense of Laos, and to the rest of Southeast Asia, endangered by the tide of Communism.²

The United Nations Re-Enters

Prime Minister Nehru of India, in May, 1959, asked for a meeting on Laos of the International Commission of the United Nations which functioned at the end of the war in Indochina. Peking demanded that the Laotian Commission be reconvened, charging that the armistice provisions were being violated. Moscow shared the view of North Vietnam and Communist China that the situation was "a serious menace to peace and security in Indochina, emanating from the actions of the Laotian Government." The Premier of Laos sent his brother, Ngon Sananikone, to the United Nations in August, to ask for an observer.

The Security Council of the United Nations named a subcommittee on September 9 to inquire into the Laotian charges of aggression by North Vietnam. Shinichi Shibuzawa, former Japanese Ambassador to Thailand, was the ranking member of the committee, which included Brigadier General Heriberto Ahrens, military adviser to the Argentine delegation to the United Nations, Ludovico Barattieri di San Pietro, an official in the Italian Foreign Ministry and Habib Bourguiba, Jr., son of the President of Tunisia and Ambassador to France.

This fact-finding team cooled its heels for four days, waiting for the Laotian Government to present the case. Then it received a 20-page brief giving the Government's charges of aggression in such generalities that substantiation and documentation were requested. With no cooperation from Laos, the committee presented a 32-page report to the United Nations on November 6, 1959, pointing out that no clear proof of "flagrant aggression" could be lodged against the North Vietnamese government. The conclusion was reached, however, that there was

² *The New York Times*, September 27, 1959.

some Communist support in the form of arms, supplies and other aid given to the Laotian rebels by North Vietnam.

The United Nations, thereupon, agreed on November 8 to send Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to Laos for a week to obtain "full personal knowledge." The Secretary General met with Premier Phoui Sananikone who informed him that Laos was following a path of neutrality, free of military bases and foreign troops; his "frail, unarmed and menaced kingdom" was relying on the United Nations for its defense.

Secretary General Hammarskjold on November 14 ordered a personal representative to join him in Laos and remain about one month. The post was given to Sakari S. Tuomioja, Executive-Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission in Europe, former Premier and Finance Minister of Finland. Tuomioja's main task was to study the Laotian economy and determine what help could be given by the United Nations to combat Communist infiltration.

The Western World

Aid to Laos has cost the United States \$225 million since 1955. This aid has been used for the Royal Laotian Army of 25,000 men; jungle highways, a power-station, irrigation dams; health services, sanitation, development of farming, communications, mining; planning for future flood control, power, irrigation projects and training for teachers and technicians.

The United States Department of State clarified (August 12, 1959) the status of American military assistance to Laos. This support began in 1950 under the so-called "pentagonal agreement" among the United States, France, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In the Geneva accords of 1954, it was agreed that Laos was to continue to accept American succor but Washington was not permitted to create a formal Military Advisory Group in that country. Consequently, the United States has in Laos a Program Evaluation Office, connected with the United States Operations Mission. This office has 71 military aides (1959) who supervise instruction in the use of weapons and logistical support. The United States also has detailed 100 technicians to Laos who instruct in the use and maintenance of

weapons and equipment. The Geneva pact gives France alone the right to have a purely military mission which instructs the Royal Laotian Army in tactics.

Moscow accused Laos of violating her neutrality policy by allowing the United States to build a military base on Laotian soil. The United States Department of State replied (August 19) that "contrary to implications in the Soviet statement the Laos Army is controlled exclusively by the sovereign Government of Laos. It is not under the direction of United States military personnel. The few American technicians in Laos are there at the request of the French and Laos governments." The statement also made clear the fact that the United States did not have any heavy or modern armament in Laos nor had it furnished any such materiel. There are no bases or air-strips "as any of the dozen foreign correspondents who are in Laos will attest." United States technicians only train in the use of World War II-type of American equipment.

Washington held that after the integration of the Communist-front Pathet Lao battalions into the army, one of them revolted and some of its roster fled to North Vietnam, "thus providing further evidence of the link between the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam." "These Communist organizations betrayed the trust of the Laotian Government and people. In mid-July they perpetrated insurrection with outside help and direction. It is this Communist-directed action which has broken the peace in Laos." The "dangerous tension" in the kingdom is of "Communist origin."

The first consignment of United States aid during the crisis reached Vientiane on August 31, 1959, in the form of 4,320 pairs of rubber-soled green canvas boots. American arms, munitions and supplies reached South Vietnam from Bangkok early in September, destined for Laos, including six plane-loads of rifles, grenades and helmets. Washington also sent Army Signal Corps troops to Asian areas to aid in air-lifting arms to Laos. General Frank Everest, head of the United States Tactical Air Command, stated (September 5) that his tactical fighters were capable of reaching Laos within 35 hours, after orders had been given.

This activity disturbed Capitol Hill. The

most articulate questioning voice was that of Senator Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.) who cautioned the White House to "go slow on any direct involvement of this nation in Laos." He wanted to know the relationship of the "sprawling growth" of American representation in Laos to "our deepening involvement with that country." The assistant Democratic leader told the Senate that only two members of the State Department were in Laos in 1953, with hundreds of United States officials there by 1959.

How is it, that after spending hundreds of millions on aid to Laos, after being assured by the Executive Branch . . . that this aid had built stability and kept out the Communists, the defense of the entire country can be so rapidly undermined by a battalion or two of Viet Minh forces?

The Washington Post (October 25, 1959) summed up the thinking of realists:

No sensible person can envisage Laos as a military ally or as an extension of Western power. The Geneva armistice contemplated a neutral status for Laos, and that is all that can reasonably be expected in fulfillment of the country's independence. But neutrality also ought to encompass the right of the legal government in Vientiane to exercise control over the entire country, or else the independence of Laos will be spurious.

The French Embassy of Laos, in September, claimed there was no active fighting and all reports of skirmishes were based on Laotian and American propaganda. The Laotian government resented the French attitude, asserting that the French were undermining civilian and military morale. The French also were criticized for making no effort to train Laotian troops and for interfering with American attempts to aid the menaced kingdom without going through French military channels. Some Laotians believed that relations with France would be severed if Washington aid continued.

Premier Sananikone sought to scotch anti-French sentiments. He stated (September 26) there had been some concern in government circles over French policy and future

"Asia is the most mountainous continent, not only in terms of mean elevation and the proportionate area of highlands but also because it has the largest mountain masses and the highest peaks. . . . The Himalayas, within a region 1,500 miles long and 100 to 150 miles wide between India and Tibet, are the world's largest system of mountains."

—From a Twentieth Century Fund Report.

relations with Paris. The Premier, speaking in French, declared that as far as he was concerned, "French-Laotian friendship was too old . . . to change. The Laos are not superficial people. They think things over deeply."

The frankest expressions of English feelings regarding Laos are found in the influential monthly, *Eastern World* of London, for September, 1959. The "proper view of Laos" should recognize the fact that

the danger that exists in Laos . . . is less from the fighting . . . than from what action the United States might initiate in the event of a collapse of the Sananikone Government. This possibility is not at all remote. Certain elements of a neutralist, non-Communist, complexion, but who would not be averse to forming some kind of coalition with the Pathet Lao, are becoming increasingly restive at the Government's almost sycophantic attachment to the United States. The fantastic extent of bribery and corruption by the ruling circles in Laos could not have gone unnoticed by the moderate groups, especially since the Americans themselves, through a Congressional inquiry in the United States, have revealed how appallingly aid funds to Laos were misused.

Laos—What Now?

The future of all Southeast Asia depends upon happenings in Laos. Dire destruction surrounds these peoples, hemmed in by valley and mountain. And yet thousands of Laotians, especially women, go about the daily work, planting rice, picking poppies, weaving garments, standing before gods within temples, preparing for the almost weekly festival in honor of a local deity, unknown to dwellers on the other side of the densely wooded hills. Some are caught to die between the fire of royal troops and rebel fighters, without having lived long enough to distinguish between freeman and slave.

The history of Laos is found in an ancient Laotian adage:

"The water drops, the ants eat the fish.
The water rises, the fish eat the ants.
So it is better to love than to hate."

Underlying the difficulties that face the "backward" nations of the world in emulating Western democracies, this historian outlines the problem for Burma, where, ". . . as elsewhere in Asia, parliamentary democracy . . . failed to function effectively in a strange cultural and political context where its potential advantages were incapable of realization."

Burma's Military Regime

By JOHN F. CADY

Professor of History, Ohio University

THE COTERIE of younger men who took over political leadership in Burma after World War II were recruited in large measure from participants in the University strike of 1936 and from members of the *Dobama Asiayone* or Thakin party. Thakins Nu and Aung San had been president and secretary respectively of the Student Union during the 1936 strike, while Thakin Kyaw Nyein and Thakin Ba Swe were close associates. Another member of the group, Thakin Shu Maung (known at present under his military title of General Ne Win) accompanied Thakin Aung San in his flight from Burma in 1940 to make contact with the Japanese military authorities.

During the course of the Japanese occupation, members of the group occupied key positions in the administration of Premier Ba Maw and in the Japan-sponsored Burma National Army headed by General Aung San. They turned against the Japanese in the end and emerged as the nationalist spokesmen for Burma when the British returned. Two outstanding leaders of the Thakins, Aung San and Mya, suffered assas-

sination in July, 1947, at which juncture Thakin Nu took over nationalist leadership. Many of the Thakins entertained socialistic views, although, save for the Communist minority, their devotion to national needs clearly outweighed their ideological commitments. This group constituted the nucleus of the politically dominant post-war Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (A.F.P.F.L.).

In January, 1948, U Nu became the first Premier of the independent Union of Burma. As a respected senior member of the Thakin group with an enviable reputation for integrity and patriotic concern, he was one of the few who could establish *rappor*t with the people generally. He spoke their idiom; he shared their folk tales and religious sentiments; he sensed intuitively their preferences. Premier Nu's outstanding achievement was his preservation of the state in the face of the violent disorders which enveloped the country during the first critical years of independence. Despite Premier Nu's success in preserving the state, he proved to be essentially a cautious person, unwilling to offend, but lacking in administrative vigor and incapable of guiding his party and government toward clearly defined objectives. As an orator and a traditional patron of Buddhism he was widely popular, but he developed no organized political backing. He preferred to live apart from the ideological and political strife in which members of his government became involved.

The heads of the Socialist party, U Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Swe, as longtime friends of the Premier, were respectful of his senior status. As Minister of Industries, U Kyaw Nyein championed rapid industrialization

John F. Cady is Chairman of the History department, Ohio University. His most recent book, *A History of Modern Burma*, was published in 1958 (Cornell University Press). He has visited Burma on three occasions: from 1935 to 1938 as lecturer in history at Judwon College; in 1945-1946, as State Department representative; and in 1955-1956 as a Fulbright scholar and Guggenheim fellow.

by governmental financing and administration. A convinced modernist, U Kyaw Nyein preferred an authoritarian approach mainly because he despaired of generating any immediate popular understanding or support for his ambitious economic schemes. Despite his key political roles as Socialist leader and as longtime secretary of the A.F.P.F.L., he, like Nu, enlisted no large mass following.

U Ba Swe, by contrast, was a highly gregarious person, personable and easily approached, fond of the races, cards and mah jong. He was a man of action rather than a Socialist theorist. He possessed substantial property from family holdings connected with tin-mining operations in the Tavoy district of lower Burma. His political strength derived in large measure from his popularity as unrivaled head of the Trade Union Congress (Burma). Although potentially an able political leader, U Ba Swe seemed to lack the self-discipline and industry required for effective administration.

The All Burma Peasant Organization (A.B.P.O.), by far the most numerous mass group associated with the A.F.P.F.L., was headed by Thakin Tin, an older person and not a member of the University clique of 1936. As Minister of Agriculture in the Union government, he tended to carry out the redistribution of arable land through peasant cadres of the A.B.P.O. rather than by using the courts and formal agencies of government. The process usually provoked complaints of flagrant abuse of authority. In several districts of Burma open feuding developed in 1957 and 1958 between the A.F.P.F.L. leadership generally (largely Socialist) and the peasant organization followers of Thakin Tin.

The other important personality connected with the recent events in Burma was General Ne Win. As a military leader closely associated with General Aung San in the freedom struggle, he took over the top command from the Karen leader, General Smith Dunn, at the outbreak of the Karen rebellion in 1949. After serving for a time as Minister of War, he resigned from the cabinet to devote himself entirely to developing the army into a disciplined and effective force. General Ne Win was regarded as a man devoid of political ambition and fully

committed to the principle that the army should not interfere in political or governmental matters. Several of his colonels, however, were associated with the Socialist party. As the spearhead of the struggle against the continuing rebellion, the army leaders were strongly anti-Communist. General Ne Win, like U Ba Swe, was something of a playboy, fond of parties and gambling. He entertained at a pretentious residence on the shore of Rangoon's Inya Lake.

Not all of the military forces of Burma were under the control of the army commander-in-chief. A separate Union Military Police had been organized during the rebellion to serve as a military arm of the Home Ministry. Some observers regarded it as a private army of the Socialist party. It competed with the army in its recruiting operations both among plains Burmans and among the frontier hill peoples. The U.M.P. was inferior to the army in heavy equipment, but it was nevertheless a disciplined and effective fighting force including a number of élite frontier battalions. Another militarized element born of the need for homeguard forces was the so-called Pyu-saw-hti, mostly a troublesome and undisciplined rabble.

The divergent interests and points of view separating the leading political personalities and their respective mass followings eventually emerged as the patriotic glow of the independence struggle began to dim. Other problems developed in connection with faltering efforts of the A.F.P.F.L. government to administer the ambitious multi-sided economic development program. Corruption became widespread. Political friction aggravated administrative inefficiency both at the center and in the districts. Amid the chorus of reciprocal accusations which emerged in 1956, a plaintive note of sadness sounded that the longtime comradeship between Burma's political leadership was eroding.

Governmental Problems

A basic difficulty arose from the fact that the general administrative structure of the government, fashioned in colonial time to care for basic requirements of police, courts and revenues, was not designed to cope with the expanded functions entailed by the program of planned economic development. The

colonial tradition had required, quite properly, that civil servants shun participation in politics. Now politics invaded administrative processes. Political leaders active within the districts (from the A.F.P.F.L. proper, the A.B.P.O., the Youth League, or the T.U.C.) not only interfered with the activities of regular administrative officers, but also by dispensing favors absorbed the perquisites of political power. Local administrative agencies received no protection from such pressures from the central government, itself corrupt and politically oriented. Politicians occupying high administrative posts were compensated meagerly salary-wise, and therefore welcomed the rent-free residences, the cars and the chauffeurs, and the opportunities for personal profit available from connection with economic development projects.

It proved impossible to find responsible leadership to man the government's activities. As of early 1959 the government included 32 ministries, 83 departments, 76 boards and corporations, 25 councils and committees, and 4 state banks. Burmese with administrative and business experience were few, especially among politicians. Consequently, the mere handful of competent individuals available at the center were unable to carry the heavy burden entailed by the proliferation of economic projects. Industrialization schemes also ran aground because of continuing disorders, lack of popular support, and the absence of the habits of disciplined labor. In the spring of 1953, United States economic aid was abruptly cancelled by Burma because of resentment over Washington's failure to curb the leakage of American-made arms to the Nationalist Chinese refugees and bandits occupying Burma's easternmost borders. This setback was aggravated in 1955-1956 by the collapse of the export price for Burma's rice, on the income from which the industrialization program was largely dependent. Actual realization of promised economic objectives seemed always to elude the grasp.

The Rift in the A.F.P.F.L.

Political warning signals developed in connection with the anticipated A.F.P.F.L. victory in the general elections of April, 1956. Irregularities occurring during the campaign were disturbing to many observers, including

Premier Nu. The A.F.P.F.L. won a safe majority of 138 seats plus some 30 seats gained by allied organizations, but the Leftist National Unity Front (N.U.F.), including an above-ground Communist nucleus, attracted a heavy vote and won 46 of the 53 opposition seats. In August, 1956, the N.U.F. convened an impressive All-Burma Conference, which drew 440 delegates from 30 districts. The N.U.F. insisted, along with other demands, that the Government negotiate peace with the Communist rebels presumably on equal terms. The outlook for democratic government was disturbing.

In June, 1956, U Nu decided to turn over the premiership temporarily to U Ba Swe in order to devote his own efforts to driving thieves and intimidators from the party. In the course of his reforming endeavors, which continued for some eight months, U Nu repeatedly stigmatized erring A.F.P.F.L. officials affiliated with the Socialist party, a practice which U Kyaw Nyein denounced as discriminatory. The personal feud between the two was taken up by their wives. Meanwhile Thakin Tin's A.B.P.O. partisans stepped up their chronic friction with local Socialist party agencies. Nu finally advocated the disassociation of all high officials of the government from mass organization support, a proposal which ran sharply contrary to the realities of the political situation. When Nu resumed the premiership in February, 1957, he took umbrage at U Kyaw Nyein's alleged opposition to his return and developed a sense of personal obligation to Thakin Tin, who apparently supported the move. Nu's alignment with Tin found concrete expression in the Premier's selection of U Kyaw Dun, one of Tin's not too reputable followers, as General Secretary of the A.F.P.F.L. Socialist critics argued that the key post should go to a more representative person.

It was finally decided to try to heal the rift by convening an All-Burma A.F.P.F.L. Congress in early 1958. The hope was illusory because the allegiance of the great majority of the 260 members of the Supreme Council was personal rather than party-oriented. Representatives of the mass organization groups, of which A.B.P.O. provided the largest contingent, voted twice, once as party delegates and again as mass organiza-

tion representatives. Although Premier Nu as party leader was the unanimous choice to preside at the Congress, his reforming exhortations were not taken seriously. In selecting the General Secretary of the A.F.P.F.L., U Kyaw Dun again won out against U Kyaw Nyein. An understanding was reportedly reached that U Kyaw Dun would resign the post within six weeks in favor of some nominee of the Socialist party. The appearance of unity at the Congress sessions was a deceptive façade behind which disunity persisted.

During the spring of 1958, police agents directed by the Home Minister, Thakin Tha Kin, a partisan of U Kyaw Nyein, began arresting offending leaders of U Tin's A.B.P.O. In seeming retaliation, Premier Nu's own special agents concerned with investigation of governmental corruption harassed vulnerable Socialist officials. The friction between rival factions flared into open violence at Insein (near Rangoon) and at Mandalay in April. Premier Nu, finally convinced that a break was unavoidable, threw in his lot with Thakin Tin. On April 27, 1958, he dismissed U Tha Kin as Home Minister and himself assumed the post, which carried control over police agencies including the Union Military Police. He also announced that U Kyaw Dun would continue as General Secretary of the A.F.P.F.L. U Ba Swe reluctantly sided with his Socialist colleague, U Kyaw Nyein, as did approximately half the Cabinet.

In order to avert the very real danger of civil strife, the leaders on both sides solemnly agreed in the presence of a venerable monk to keep the peace and to make no further changes in the government until after Parliament was assembled in emergency session in early June to determine which faction would rule. Routine governmental operations virtually ceased. A feverish contest for votes involved employment of highly irregular measures. When it became apparent that most of the A.F.P.F.L. majority in Parliament would vote for the Swe-Nyein faction, the Premier offered statehood to dissident Arakanese and Mons and then enlisted the support of the N.U.F. delegates in Parliament by promising full amnesty to surrendering Communist insurgents. In late May, he even dismissed treason charges pending against two imprisoned N.U.F. members of the Parliament, so that they could attend the

parliamentary sessions and vote with their colleagues. By such tactics Premier Nu managed to win a majority of eight votes in the final count, 127 to 119, but at a heavy cost of compromising his political future. Because of the narrowness of his victory he announced the holding of early general elections for a new Parliament. The special election was scheduled for autumn, following the monsoon rainy season.

But the governmental situation could not be kept stable in the prevailing atmosphere of political recrimination. Regular government functioning ground to a halt. Clashes multiplied in the districts between A.B.P.O. partisans and pro-Nyein Youth Front factions. On the Rangoon dock front, pro-Tin malcontents, drawn from the older T.U.C(B.) dockworker's cooperative and now affiliated with the newly-formed Union Labor Organization (U.L.O.), took over loading operations amid mounting violence. Similar controversy developed within other union groups. Karen and Kachin state leaders, who had thrown in their lot with the defeated Swe-Nyein faction, were replaced by newly appointed but pro-Nu incumbents in the face of vigorous protests. The military organizations were also restive. Elements of the Military Police and the *Pyu-saw-hthis* cherished their traditional Socialist alignment, while army leaders strongly opposed Nu's friendly overtures to the Communists. Leaders of both factions slandered opponents. Unless the growing tensions could be resolved quickly by orderly elections, a tide of violence threatened to engulf the country.

Meanwhile Premier Nu's attempted re-orientation of governmental policy was hampered by lack of time and by his ambivalent commitments. In contradiction to his alliance with the pro-Communist N.U.F. in the interest of pacification, he convened conferences of business and landlord representatives, who were afforded a welcome opportunity to criticize the entire socialization program. Burmese nationalist sentiment deplored Nu's political promises to the Arakanese and Mons as well as his leniency toward surrendering rebels. Without denying Nu's sincere concern to end governmental corruption, observers were aware that the Tin-Kyaw Dun A.B.P.O. partisans were as guilty as any agency or governmental office controlled by

his political rivals. Nu's allegedly "Clean A.F.P.F.L." had a hollow ring.

The problem came into focus at the end of August when it became apparent that Nu dared not convene the routine budget session of the old Parliament for fear that his eight-vote majority would not hold. Election plans were incomplete and the constitutional deadline for approving the budget was the end of September. It was therefore proposed to certify the new budget by executive ordinance without asking parliamentary approval. The Swe-Nyein faction loudly protested the decision. Tension mounted and rumors proliferated. In a determined effort to enlist popular support, Premier Nu, in September, embarked on an extensive political tour of upper Burma with the widow of U Aung San acting as his campaign partner. By the time he returned to Rangoon on September 22, much encouraged by his welcome reception, the crisis at the capital had come to a head.

Premier Nu's complacency and optimism were quickly dissipated. Certain officers of the Union Military Police, presumably in collusion with U Kyaw Dun, conspired to stage a military coup without top-command authorization. In the presence of this threat, influential army colonels convinced General Ne Win and Nu that civil strife could be avoided and the Constitution saved only by Parliament's acceptance of General Ne Win as emergency Prime Minister for a six month's period, a move permitted by the constitution. There was no acceptable alternative. The official announcement of the decision was made by U Nu on September 26, 1958, and the transfer of the premiership took place as scheduled, on October 28.

General Ne Win's accession was accomplished legally by vote of an overwhelming majority of the members of Parliament. Popular acceptance of the move stemmed from widespread realization that any outbreak of civil war would have engulfed the entire country in a welter of strife. Another result of the situation was to discredit U Kyaw Dun, whose unsavory past eventually caught up with him. He was subsequently arrested and tried on a kidnapping and extortionist charge.

The positive impact of General Ne Win's caretaker government was quickly evident.

He eliminated all politicians from his cabinet, installing in their place individuals of proved integrity and competence who quickly ended the orgy of extravagance and corruption. Army colonels were "lent" to government departments where vigorous reforming efforts were needed. In a highly dramatic move Ne Win mobilized army units, government employees generally, and civilian volunteers to clear the refuse and garbage from the streets and alleys of Rangoon and other cities. Several attempts were needed before this herculean task was completed. In early December, he dissolved the notoriously incompetent Rangoon Corporation, assigning its authority to an army colonel.

Role of the Military Regime

The new government also demolished illegal huts within Rangoon, resettling the displaced persons in the suburbs, thus eliminating health and fire hazards. The streets were cleared of droves of ownerless dogs. Even though it was not possible at the time to establish refuse collecting services on a routine basis (garbage vans were eventually ordered from Australia in July, 1959), the improvements realized were impressive and, except for the ousted squatters, universally acclaimed. Railway service was improved and brought under discipline. Consumer prices on staple items were reduced sharply; a new dockyard was promised for long-neglected Akyab; more than 1130 fictitious and irresponsible import firms (mainly Burman) were disregistered. A government not dependent on votes demonstrated unaccustomed vigor.

Other gains followed. Units of the army, operating in the countryside against rebel and bandit gangs, made substantial progress in eliciting the cooperation of harried villagers. In early December, Premier Ne Win, acting in his role as Premier and University Chancellor, jailed student provocateurs and outlawed Communist and other partisan political agitation on the University campus, an action long overdue. He also installed a new Rector and assessed moderate tuition fees in a serious effort to improve academic standards.

Of more fundamental importance was the cancellation of many aspects of the ambitious economic development program of the pre-

vious regime. This entailed among other things the dismissal of the American team of economic advisers. Because the program had been associated with widespread corruption, the very term socialization became in time one of opprobrium. Even Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein eventually found it politic to disavow the Socialist label. Eventually, the new government made deliberate efforts to attract needed foreign capital by offering guarantees against nationalization.

Although General Ne Win's regime halted the deterioration of law and order, the six month emergency period was not long enough to prepare for peaceful and orderly elections. Under the circumstances the Premier announced his resignation in mid-February, 1959, refusing longer to accept his responsibilities unless the relevant section of the Constitution limiting his rule to six month's time was suspended. The requisite action for amending the Constitution was accordingly taken by Parliament and the General was again elected as Premier on February 27, 1959. Parliamentary procedures were thus technically maintained, but democracy was eroding away. The very success of army rule tended to discredit the democratic process as a whole and to curtail political freedom. The Government silenced outspoken press critics and arrested economic racketeers. Burma's Coco Island group, offshore, became a well-populated penal colony including scores of N.U.F. and Nu-Tin offenders.

Some informed persons, realizing the value of stable control, doubted the feasibility of early elections even though such procedures constituted the only hope of escaping naked military rule. In Burma as elsewhere in Asia, parliamentary democracy had failed to function effectively in a strange cultural and political context where its potential advantages were incapable of realization. Popular sovereignty embodied no compelling symbols of authority, and failed to arouse public confidence or enthusiasm. A few observers surmised that a presidential-type executive might work better. Politics as practiced in conjunction with state-controlled economic development was everywhere regarded with cynical contempt. However reassuring the strongly anti-Communist attitude of the army leaders might be, this fact carried no assur-

ance that political freedom would survive. More hopeful auguries were Premier Ne Win's deference to the Parliament (August, 1959) in soliciting approval of the new annual budget and his continued assurances that election plans were proceeding.

Shift to the West

A marked pro-Western shift in Burma's foreign policy occurred in 1959, due in part to the strongly anti-Communist sentiment in the army and in part to Communist Chinese intervention in Tibet followed by incursions across India's Himalayan border. A privately-contributed Dalai Lama Fund was launched in Rangoon. Burma's own long undemarcated border with China involved eventual territorial adjustments of some political and strategic importance. Under such circumstances Burma solicited American financial aid to improve inland water transport and highway communications running northward from Rangoon plus contributions toward building an Intermediate College in Rangoon. Burma did not join Seato, long an object of local criticism as being gratuitously provocative, but the new government was clearly appreciative of American good will.

The marked anti-Communist orientation was dramatized by several events which concerned persons associated with the Soviet embassy. In April, 1959, accusations made by a representative of the local *Tass* News Agency that an anti-Communist editor had accepted a substantial bribe from the Americans became the basis for a libel suit involving the same amount. The designated sum, if collected, would be allocated to the Dalai Lama Fund. The agent took refuge in the Soviet embassy to escape serving of the court warrant. The second incident involved an abortive effort of the Soviet Military Attaché in late April to escape from embassy custody. Efforts of press representatives to reach the person at the exit airport resulted in their rough handling by Russian guards, entailing an eventual blackout at Rangoon of all Soviet news releases. Two months later a defecting Information Officer of the Soviet embassy took refuge in the American embassy. Interrogation by Burmese police authorities elicited from him damning evidence regarding local

Soviet subversionary activities, after which the officer was permitted to depart on an American plane. Chinese aggression and Soviet subversion, combined with local Communist rebellion, added up to a sizeable indictment.

The prospects for holding elections for a new Parliament in the spring of 1960 are good despite some negative factors. Uncertainty regarding the outcome could influence incumbent members of Parliament to vote for a continuance of General Ne Win's regime for an additional year. But the life of the 1956 Parliament would expire in 1960 and only the development of a dire political emergency could warrant an election postponement.

The main protagonists would be the rival and power-hungry factions of the A.F.P.F.L.

(Continued from page 68)

very difficult to ask for the assistance of any Western power directly or to accept it indirectly by joining an alliance with Pakistan (which Premier Ayub Khan offered him in September).

Whatever the ulterior motives of China's policy might be and whatever long-run effects she may be hoping for, the immediate advantage of her conquests has merely improved somewhat her strategic position toward India. But for this gain she has paid a high price. The cause of communism has suffered a serious setback in India and Asia—to the point of splitting the Indian Communist party. Favorable prospects for the settlement of Indian-Pakistani tension over their border, the use of the Indus river waters, and monetary policies are in part due to the threat from the north. President Eisenhower's visit to New Delhi and Kabul may contribute further to a feeling of mutual trust between India and Pakistan, bringing about the close cooperation so necessary for the economic well-being of both nations, and the

both of which have been thoroughly blackened by reciprocal accusations since the rift in 1958. The Swe-Nyein faction appears to be the stronger of the two, although Nu's personality still exerts strong popular appeal. Army leaders are not likely to countenance vigorous campaigning by Communist and proto-Communist factions, such as the N.U.F. The appearance of numerous other parties, actively encouraged by army leadership, will probably preclude any clear-cut majority for either A.F.P.F.L. faction. The political parties may function but not rule. It appears safe to conclude, therefore, regardless of the election outcome, that military leadership will continue for an indefinite period of time to be an important element in the Burma political spectrum, and this by tacit popular approval.

release of Indian troops from the Kashmir border. The Soviet Union's neutrality in the situation must be discouraging to the Chinese, cooling their spirit of adventure, and perhaps suggesting the idea to the Peking government that their big neighbor in the West may not cherish the thought of growing Chinese strength in Inner Asia any more than their southern neighbor.

Undesirable as the Himalayan developments are from every standpoint, their consequences so far have been favorable to the cause of the United States. As long as this trend continues, it would be advisable for her to continue a discreet policy, to forego the futile satisfactions of an "I told you so" attitude, and to be ready to give what aid is asked. It may be a disappointment to some Americans that their country is largely condemned to inactivity in this situation. But it must be remembered that the relatively favorable developments took place not as a result of any wise American policy, but as a result of the mistakes of the United States' antagonist.

"To those of us who spend our lives working on scientific problems, science is a great intellectual adventure of such interest that nothing else we ever do can compare with it. We are attempting to understand the order of a physical universe, vast in extent in space and time, and most complicated and beautiful in its details. In this vast universe we find living things of which we ourselves are a part and these living things, constituting in bulk only a minute fraction of the whole, are yet some of the most amazing and most fascinating parts of the whole. . . ."

—Harold C. Urey, Professor-at-large of Chemistry, University of California at Berkeley, in an address delivered in New York City, November 2, 1959.

Analyzing the situation in the Federation of Malaya and in Singapore, this Southeast Asian specialist traces the developments that led to a conservative government in Malaya and a Leftist government in Singapore—a fact which may make difficult any future union between the two countries.

The Communist Threat to Malaya and Singapore

By GERALD P. DARTFORD

Author of *A Short History of Malaya*

THE QUESTION which is most frequently asked about all the uncommitted countries of Southern Asia today is whether they can succeed in developing their national economies as free democracies, or whether they will be drawn, by external force or internal weakness, into the Communist fold. Two elections, held less than three months apart, on May 30 in Singapore and August 19 in the Federation of Malaya, illustrate the different political reactions of these two territories, so closely linked in their history and their economy.

In the Federation, the Alliance formed by the conservative elements of the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities won a victory which assured them a five year tenure of power for the continuance of their cautious, moderate, but nationalist policy. In Singapore, the People's Action party (P.A.P.), which draws its strength from the unassimilated, Chinese-speaking youth of the new island state, swept the board even more decisively, and formed the first administration to exercise complete internal self-government.

Gerald P. Dartford spent 18 years in the education service in Malaya, retiring recently from his position as Assistant Director of Education in the Ministry of Kuala Lumpur. Author of *The Growth of the British Commonwealth*, he is presently teaching at the Salisbury School (Connecticut).

The P.A.P. is a violently anti-colonial party, claiming to be Socialist but containing within its ranks many Communists and fellow-travelers. The explanation of these phenomena is to be found in the different development of the two territories since the end of the Second World War.

The Separation of Singapore and the Federation

Before the war Malaya combined the practical uniformity imposed by British rule with diversity of political units. The three Straits Settlements of Singapore, Malacca and Penang, essentially the creation of European commercial enterprise, formed a British colony; the nine Malay states, nominally sovereign, were protectorates under varying degrees of British control. Each Malay state had its own Sultan and government. To add to the complexity, four had also a federal government and five had not. The Japanese occupation swept away this haphazard organization, which had grown up piecemeal with the gradual penetration of Malaya by the British. It also began to awaken political consciousness in all Malayans, whether of Malay, Chinese or Indian race.¹

When the British returned in 1945, therefore, it was with the realization that steps must be taken to prepare Malaya for self-government. This, however, necessarily involved the setting up of a real central government to unite the country. After much dis-

¹ It is essential to understand that the term *Malayan* is used for all residents of Malaya of whatever race, and that the term *Malay* is confined to the race and language of the Malays, the indigenous people of the country.

cussion, this was provided by the establishment on February 1, 1948, of the Federation of Malaya, comprising the nine Malay states and the two British settlements of Malacca and Penang. The Federation was mainly the result of collaboration between the British and the leaders of the Malay community, and both had good reasons for leaving out Singapore. The British needed to maintain their strategic foothold in the East of which Singapore was the main base, and the Malays did not wish to see their slender majority in the population of the Federation swamped by the inclusion of Singapore's one million Chinese and only 150,000 Malays.

In less than ten years the Federation moved in an orderly way through stages of gradually increasing self-government to complete independence on August 30, 1957. This was achieved despite a most serious revolt by the Communists beginning in 1948, which has lingered on as an exhausting guerrilla war and has not even now been entirely suppressed. (At one time it looked as if the whole Chinese community might willingly or unwillingly be drawn over to support the Communists, but thanks to the firm measures of General Sir Gerald Templer and the steady courage and loyalty of the Malays the tide turned after 1952. Actually the Communist threat probably helped to bring about the high degree of co-operation between the three main racial groups, the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. This co-operation made possible the unification of the government and the people, despite the barriers of language, religion, diverse customs and divergent loyalties.)

Tunku Abdul Rahman

The chief credit for this co-operation is due to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader of the United Malays' National Organization (U.M.N.O.) since 1951, and Sir Cheng Lock Tan, the veteran leader of the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.). Both used their influence to bring about a coalition between these two most powerful parties when the first municipal and state elections were held. So successful did the "Alliance" prove that it was placed on a permanent basis, and a common platform was worked out by a process of give and take between Malay and

Chinese interests. Later the Malayan Indian Congress (M.I.C.) adhered to the Alliance, but because the Indians form only about ten per cent of the population its influence has been small compared to the two senior partners.

When the first national elections were held in July, 1955, the Alliance proved irresistible, winning 51 out of the 52 elected seats in the Federal Legislative Council. Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other Alliance leaders then became ministers, sharing responsibility with the last British High Commissioner and other officials during the two years which led up to independence. Thus on August 30, 1957, Tunku Abdul Rahman became the first Prime Minister of a free Malaya. Tunku means "prince" and, as the brother of the late Sultan of Kedah, Abdul Rahman is by birth a Malay aristocrat. He developed his political abilities late in life, after an upbringing not very different from many other Malays of good family. He studied law in Britain, showing no academic brilliance, but thoroughly enjoying himself. Unlike many leaders of Asia today, he is not bitter towards the former colonial rulers, gets on well with the British, and is liked by them. He spent many years in the government service before he became the leader of U.M.N.O., and he has often expressed gratitude to the British for the efficient services independent Malaya inherited from their regime.

Tunku Abdul Rahman's success has been the result of his democratic manner, his thorough understanding of the Malays, his friendliness to all races, his common sense, and his rejection of doctrinaire opinions of any kind. Although like most Malays he pays respect to the Rulers and has established an elective monarch as the head of the state (Yang di-pertuan Agong), he has been careful to rest his power on the support of the people and not on any royal favor. As leader of U.M.N.O., the Tunku has had to deal with a nationalist movement which arose quickly after the war, has its conservative and extreme wings, and is rooted deeply in every town and village where Malays live. Usually placid, the Malays are apt to be hasty and obstinate when really stirred, and U.M.N.O. has not been an easy horse to ride. Its founder, Sir Onn bin Jaafar, once rode on a crest of popularity, but had to

give up the leadership when he was unable to persuade U.M.N.O. to become a national, non-communal party.

It is the measure of Abdul Rahman's statesmanship that he has, through the Alliance, succeeded in doing just what his predecessor failed to accomplish, without losing the support of the Malay nationalists. To those who know that Malaysians were accustomed to think along communal lines it is remarkable to see that Malays have been persuaded to vote for Alliance candidates of Chinese or Indian race and vice versa. Unlike many leaders in Asia today, Abdul Rahman has never bound himself to socialism or any other formal political doctrine. He says simply that it is his aim that all the people of Malaya shall be free, happy and prosperous, and he is prepared to use any reasonable means to these ends. As it has been well said, whereas Nehru wants to be clever, the Tunku is content to be wise.

The Malayan Chinese Association

In the successful *mariage de convenance* of the Alliance the M.C.A. represents, in the main, the business interests of the Chinese, who control most of the small-scale commerce and share with European firms an ever-increasing proportion of the larger business in banking and in the operation of the two major industries of tin-mining and rubber planting. The Chinese have contributed very largely to the amazing economic development of the Malay states during the last 80 years and are today by far the wealthiest community in Malaya. They have always been interested primarily in business and content to leave the less lucrative affairs of government to others. The M.C.A. has accepted the supremacy of U.M.N.O. in the Alliance in return for the stability and political peace favorable to business. U.M.N.O., whose Malay members are all automatically citizens, has provided most of the votes to win the victories of the Alliance at the polls in 1955 and 1959, while the M.C.A. has provided the central organization and the party funds. It is noticeable that, although nine of the twelve cabinet ministers are Malays, the two Chinese hold the portfolios of Finance and Labor, and until recently that of Commerce and Industry. The one cabinet post held by an Indian reflects the minor part

that is played by the M.I.C. in the Alliance.

The Record of the Alliance

During the two years since independence the Federation government has naturally been much concerned to establish its identity as a free nation. The desire to stand well with the Afro-Asian bloc, particularly with India and Indonesia, has kept Malaya out of Seato, though relations with two Asian members, Thailand and the Philippines, are very cordial. Yet the West has every reason to be pleased with Malaya's attitude. Of her own free will she has remained within the Commonwealth and has particularly close ties with Australia. One of the very first acts of independent Malaya was to conclude a Treaty of External Defence and Mutual Assistance with Britain, which allowed the latter to maintain forces and bases in the Federation for defence against external attack and for the continued prosecution of the struggle against the Communist terrorists within. The Alliance government has never wavered in its determination to crush the guerrillas. It has achieved such success that only about 1000 demoralized terrorists still remain at large, and the Communist headquarters seems to have been withdrawn north of the border into Siam. Since this struggle has fully occupied the small Malayan armed forces, they could not have contributed to the anti-Communist cause more effectively in any other way.

Internally, the Alliance government has also been successful in reassuring foreign interests by its stability and moderation; much needed capital and assistance have been attracted in the work of developing the economy. Education has been expanded so that virtually all Malayan children are assured of at least six years of primary schooling, while secondary and university facilities have continued to grow. The standard of living remains the highest in Southeast Asia. Above all, the good sense of the U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. leaders has kept the Alliance together and Malaya has been spared the horrors of communal violence.

The Federal Elections

The Alliance could, therefore, face with confidence the first elections to be held after

independence, although Tunku Abdul Rahman thought it wise to hand over the Prime Ministership to his trusted lieutenant, Dato Abdul Razak bin Hussain, for five months while he campaigned throughout the country. In the state elections, the Alliance carried all except the backward states of Kelantan and Trengganu, which are almost completely Malay in population.

The success of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party in these states showed the main threat to the Alliance, but in the national elections held on August 19, 1959, the Islamic party won only 13 of the 102 seats in the House of Representatives, mainly in the same two states. Elsewhere, the policy of an Islamic state and closer union with Indonesia made little headway. The Alliance, with 73 seats, has a comfortable majority. The remainder of the seats were split among a number of small parties, the most notable being the Socialists who won eight and the People's Progressive party with four. Tunku Abdul Rahman returned to the post of Prime Minister; he can look forward to nearly five more years of power.

The Position of the Malayan Communist Party

As proscribed rebels, the Communists could not take part openly in the election, nor does their influence seem to have affected the result. The leaders of the M.C.P. have long realized that their abortive revolt has done their cause more harm than good. They would gladly call off the fight if they could gain greater freedom to work openly in politics. This escape has been closed by Tunku Abdul Rahman's firm refusal to discuss anything but surrender terms. Nevertheless, there are sections of the Malayan population which could form potential recruiting grounds for communism, particularly the poorer sections of the Malay peasantry who might well be receptive to Communist influences from Indonesia. Then there are the rural Chinese, 600,000 of whom were resettled in new villages as an emergency measure in the guerrilla war with the terrorists. Political parties wishing to challenge the Alliance will inevitably seek to draw these two classes away from traditional Malay and urban Chinese leadership. This is what the Communist party would like to do, and it may be expected to give overt assistance

to any of the opposition parties, Islamic or Socialist, which seem likely to be able to undermine the appeal of the Alliance.

The Labor Front in Singapore

The Labor Front government in Singapore had to face a much more serious threat during the four years it held office, in coalition with the few Alliance members of the legislature. The Labor Front owed its existence and its victory in the 1955 elections to the dynamic but quite unpredictable personality of David Marshall, the Jewish lawyer who was Singapore's first Chief Minister. Soon after his advent to power, the city was swept by very serious rioting, which showed how dangerous and volatile were the underground forces on the island, and the degree to which they had fallen under Communist influence. In a short time David Marshall resigned after a disagreement with the British government over the internal security of the island. Since then he has damaged the Labor Front by violent quarrels with his former friends.

Marshall's place as leader of the Labor Front and Chief Minister was taken by Lim Yew Hock. He faced a difficult situation with courage and good humor, and on his record deserved a better fate. Much useful work of social reform was carried out, and Lim was able to conclude successfully the negotiations with the British government for the new constitution. Against the Communists Lim took a strong line. In August, 1957, a number of arrests of Communists and their sympathizers were made; six leaders of the opposition People's Action party (P.A.P.) and several trade union leaders were detained.

Although the Singapore government was able to produce captured documents that showed clearly that the Communists were working to infiltrate the P.A.P. and the trade unions, and although Lim's policy had the full sympathy of the Alliance government in the Federation, it won him no support among the masses of Singapore's population, especially the China-born and Chinese educated sections who were now for the first time being granted citizenship. Here there was no delicate balance between Malay and immigrant races, calling for compromise and moderation. Singapore, far larger than any town in the Federation, is overwhelmingly

Chinese, and its population contains an abnormally large proportion of young people. Most of these have grown up amid the crowded sections of the city's Chinatown, where close ties have been maintained with the home country. What education they have had has been in Chinese schools. They have come through their impressionable teenage years largely since the victory of communism in China in 1950.

To these young men and women it seemed that communism had succeeded, where all other regimes had failed, in lifting China from a degraded state to a great power respected and feared by the world. Their hatred was for the colonial government, the wealthy merchants, and the Malayan Chinese section of the population that had lost close ties with China and, through Western education in the English language, had enjoyed the privileges of government employment and higher education.

The P.A.P.

This was the situation which suited the purposes of the Communists. In the over-age students of the over-crowded and ill-disciplined Chinese secondary schools they had willing tools who could be urged on against the government in the supposed defense of Chinese culture. Here were large trade unions to be infiltrated, and in the P.A.P. an active Left-wing party much more opposed to colonial rule than to communism. It is true that Lee Kuan Yew, the very able, Cambridge-educated leader of the P.A.P., has done his best to prevent the Communists from capturing the party machine. Paradoxically, he and the other top leaders are English-educated rebels against the Western influences which have hitherto controlled Singapore. The comparatively moderate group which he represents has gained acceptance for a platform based on an "independent, democratic, non-Communist, Socialist Malaya," which implies union with the Federation on terms the Alliance certainly would not desire. The moderates have not, however, been able to keep the pro-Communist elements out of executive positions in the party. Their careful neutralist attitude is compounded of the practical realization that without Communist help they have little chance of winning power and the hope that

they will be able to ride the whirlwind they are raising.

In spite of this attitude, or perhaps because of it, the P.A.P. has gone from strength to strength. In the elections for the City Council of Singapore in December, 1957, it managed to emerge as the largest party, with 13 seats in the 32-member council. It is typical that the average age of the successful P.A.P. candidate was 27 years. Although short of a majority, the P.A.P. was able to force their nominee, Ong Eng Guan, as Mayor on a reluctant but divided opposition. The proceedings of the council were thereafter carried on in a chamber packed with the P.A.P.'s youthful supporters, who loudly voiced their approval or disapproval of speakers. Permanent officials of the council were harassed into resignation, and the P.A.P. announced its intention of abolishing the municipal government altogether if it won the elections for the Assembly of Singapore. Although on purely administrative grounds there might be much to be said for the unification of the government (which has since been carried out), the methods used were too reminiscent of Communist methods of seizing power to give much comfort to those who hoped for a democratic Singapore.

Singapore's Constitution

The details of the new constitution were agreed on at meetings between a delegation led by Lim Yew Hock and the representatives of the British government in May, 1958. Singapore was to have complete internal self-government with a Malayan as the formal head of state (Yang di-Pertuan Besar). Legislative functions would be carried out by an elected Assembly of 51 members. The party winning the majority in the Assembly was to have the right to form the government. Britain retained sovereignty, and with it control of Singapore's foreign policy and, external defense. The vital decision of when internal disorder was to be considered serious enough to justify British intervention was to be left to an Internal Security Council of three British and three Singapore representatives, with one representative of the Federation. The first elections and the inauguration of the new constitution were set for the end of May, 1959, and during the year pre-

arations were to be made, especially the registration of many new citizens who had been formerly aliens without a vote.

During this year, the P.A.P. worked hard to make itself a strongly organized and strictly disciplined party. It had ability in its leadership and it succeeded. On the other hand, the efforts to bring about a coalition of the moderate parties failed. Lim Yew Hock tried hard to broaden the base of the Labor Front but could get no official response from the Right-wing Liberal-Socialists, backed by some of the wealthier Chinese merchants. Some Liberal-Socialists, it is true, broke away and joined Lim's Singapore People's Alliance, but on the other hand some of his own party broke away and insisted on standing as the Labor Front. In addition, there was a proliferation of no fewer than eight new parties which led to the general confusion and still further divided the anti-P.A.P. vote. Finally Lim made the mistake of fighting the election, not on his own government's creditable record but as a fight against the menace of communism.

The Singapore Election

The elections were held on May 30, 1959, and 90 per cent of the greatly enlarged electorate voted. The victory of the P.A.P. was

decisive on any count. Party members won 43 of the 51 seats, 31 by an absolute majority. Even if the opposition had combined it would, therefore, probably have lost, but its division gave the P.A.P. another 12 seats. The P.A.P. polled 53.4 per cent of the votes cast. The Singapore People's Alliance won 4 seats, and the Liberal-Socialists none at all. Three seats in predominately Malay constituencies went to the U.M.N.O.-M.C.A. Alliance. The Singapore electorate had shown in a very definite manner that a large part of it did not look upon communism as a bogey.

The leader of the P.A.P., Lee Kuan Yew, was named Prime Minister after the Governor had agreed to the release of his followers in detention. Lee then formed a Cabinet of six Chinese, one Malay, one Indian and one Eurasian. It remains to be seen whether it can provide the democratic government which it advocates for a "non-communist" Singapore. Union with the Federation, as the indispensable means of attaining full independence from Britain, stands high in its platform, but the subsequent victory of the Alliance in the Federation would seem to render its aim for a "non-Communist, Socialist Malaya" rather remote at the present time.

"One of the most heartening sights in recent years has been the revival of the economic strength of our free-world partners in Western Europe and Japan. They are now able to offer their peoples the prospect of continuing economic growth and of sustained high levels of economic activity. In so doing, they demonstrate the continuing vitality of free societies.

"Our current balance of payments problem is, in part, a result of this growing free world recovery. We want to meet the problem through measures which promote rather than restrict world trade. I am confident that we can do so as other industrialized free countries assume the full role which their recovery permits.

"These countries no longer need to lean on us for the preponderant support of most common ventures. Rather, they are able, and I believe willing, to participate increasingly in the common cause of freeing and expanding trade, and helping the newly developing countries to find their way to health, growth and stability. . . .

"The problem is to see to it that the deficit is reduced by means which enlarge international trade and do not restrict it—by methods which promote competition and the flow of development capital rather than restrict them.

"If this approach is to succeed, action is required of other countries, particularly Western Europe and Japan, to open their doors to American exports and to provide additional capital to the development-hungry nations of Asia, Africa and the Near East and Latin America."

—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, in an address delivered November 16, 1959.

As this author sums up Indonesian foreign policy, "neutralism can be made to pay, and Indonesia as a recipient of aid from both the United States and the Soviet bloc is an example of how profitable it can be." ". . . The flow of foreign credit to Indonesia over the years has been so steady and plentiful" that Indonesians are now concerned that their economy may be overburdened by the "agreed-to repayment schedule."

Indonesia in the Cold War

By JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF

Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Bridgeport

AMONG THE new nation states of Southeast Asia the Republic of Indonesia has perhaps been the most consistent advocate of a position of "neutralism" in the cold war. Neither a chain of armed insurrections, nor the growing domestic strength of the Indonesian Communist party, nor again increasing reliance on foreign—especially United States—assistance in stabilizing the national economy, have altered what the government calls Indonesia's "active and independent foreign policy," which is frankly aimed, according to a recent pronouncement of Foreign Minister Subandrio, "at getting material benefit and profit for the sake of the nation's construction."¹ Leading Indonesian statesmen have repeatedly professed to see advantages in the ideological rationales of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. As recently as Indonesia's independence day celebration, on August 17, 1959, President Sukarno declared that the American Declaration of Independence as well as the Communist Manifesto "contain several truths, which remain truths and remain valid eternally."² A studious impartiality in the East-West conflict is then, at least in theory, one of the cornerstones of Indonesia's policy toward the rest of the world.

Quite apart from the *ad hoc* political and

Justus M. van der Kroef was born and educated in Indonesia. He formerly taught at Michigan State University. His books include *Dutch Policy in Indonesia* and *Indonesia in the Modern World*.

economic advantages which such "neutralist" freedom of leverage brings with it, Indonesia's position is determined by two sets of ideological factors: (1) neither the Communist bloc nor the free world have, as far as Indonesians are concerned, clean hands, though both have much to offer to Indonesia's development, and (2) Indonesia's policies, whether economic, foreign or cultural, should not be copied from an alien source, but should reflect a "national identity." Many Indonesian spokesmen have expressed admiration for the rapid economic development of both the Soviet Union and Red China, nor have they forgotten that in the darkest days of colonial repression the principal ally of struggling Indonesian nationalists was communism. Yet the cost in human misery of Communist achievements repels such spokesmen also. The technical and cultural heritage of the free world countries similarly is admired, but the competitive free enterprise system (with which former colonialist exploitation is held to be inseparably connected), the maintenance of colonial possessions by many of the free world powers such as France, the Netherlands and England, the power interplay of a system of parliamentary government, and especially recently, the alleged moral licentiousness of certain facets of American and European culture, are all officially deprecated in varying degrees. While selecting "what is best" from both communism and the free world, Indonesian leaders appear particularly concerned with formulating and applying what

¹ *The Indonesian Spectator*, (Djakarta), August 1, 1959, p. 13.

² *Indonesian Observer*, (Djakarta), August 21, 1959, p. 3.

are believed to be uniquely Indonesian principles in national life, e.g., *gotong royong* (a term denoting mutual assistance and common work effort in many parts of the traditional Indonesian village society) and *Pantjasila*, the official national ideology of Indonesia, formulated by Sukarno, which comprises the "five principles": belief in God, democracy, nationalism, social justice, and humanitarianism.

Maintaining this independent position in practice has, however, been extraordinarily difficult, not the least because actual domestic political and economic currents continue to reflect closely the larger ideological issues of the cold war, and because the principles of the much vaunted national and presumably independent ideologies often are extremely vague or even irrelevant to existing problems. For example, again and again Indonesian leaders, from the President on down, castigate the evils of competitive free enterprise ("free fight liberalism" as Sukarno has been wont to characterize it), without apparently noticing that much in the country's socio-economy predisposes toward such a system. As a recent observer has indicated: "Indonesia is—even when allowance is made for its ambitious government planning and widespread disdain for liberal institutions—a capitalist country, in that, by all odds, most of its economic activity (including much of agriculture) is organized for profit by businessmen making individualistic decisions."³

For decades now *gotong royong* and similar ancient practices have steadily been eroded as a result of growing individualism and the monetization of traditional rural life. The idealistic and doctrinaire insistence on *gotong royong* and village collectivism completely overlooks the realities of the village economy, the steady spread of a landlord class, of sub-tenancy and of the rural proletariat. The romantic picture of a traditional village "togetherness," propagated now as the basis of national Indonesian development, obscures the anti-collectivist structure of the actual economic process and the frankly capitalistic aspirations of those with landed wealth. The only political organization which appears to be actively concerned with this conflict between reality and theory

³ *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, (Djakarta), May-June, 1959, p. 189.

is the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party—P.K.I.). It too favors *gotong royong* but much more radically: elimination of the landlord class, redistribution of the land to the landless, and enforced abolition of the remnants of social "feudalism" such as peasant indebtedness. In the densely populated island of Java, where the rural landless number at least 10 million (out of a total island population of 56 million), and where in area after area recent studies show the steady concentration of landownership in the hands of a few, the P.K.I. has, as a result of this program, become one of the most important political parties.

Just as the *gotong royong* mystique, with its vague and general exhortations, bypasses the real problems of the rural economy, so does it impede the capitalistic urban entrepreneurial element. The endless manipulation of export-import regulations by the state, the extensive control over prices and wages, and the belief that the government should own or direct all major commercial channels, industries, transport, communications and related fields, have led to growing dissatisfaction on the part of the indigenous entrepreneurial group, not only in Java but also on the other islands where impatience with national bureaucratic inefficiency and controls contributed greatly to recent regional insurrections against Djakarta. In Java leading business groups signed a "charter" on May 13, 1959, for presentation to the national government, in which the importance of the role of independent enterprise was stressed and in which they complained of the government's policy of giving monopoly import rights involving major commodities such as rice and textiles to special government-sponsored companies. Subsequently, a group of Indonesian entrepreneurs petitioned parliament for a definite law specifying their rights, since the unending flow of new regulations had greatly obstructed national business.

While on the one hand the government's sudden devaluation of *rupiah* notes of large denominations has caused great hardship and uncertainty, on the other hand the public is threatened, because of its decreasing confidence in the government directed economy, by new penal measures. When in the last week of October, 1959, rumors circu-

lated that the government would also devalue 100 Rupiah and 50 Rupiah notes and as a result business came virtually to a standstill, the government not only denied the rumors (which, considering the suddenness of the drastic devaluation of the 1000 Rupiah and 500 Rupiah notes on August 25, 1959, and the promise of further measures, were understandable), but also began systematic razing of shopkeepers who had refused to open their doors for business, under a new regulation, which provides for punishment up to and including the death penalty for "economic adventurers" who spread rumors.

Considering the stifling system of economic controls imposed by the state, not only on the agricultural sector but also on commerce and industry, one is struck by the perpetuation today of the old colonial regulatory pattern, especially as it prevailed earlier in the nineteenth century. Friedrich Engels writing to Karl Kautsky in 1884, for example, characterized Java then as a rampant case of "state socialism," in which traditional village communalism had become subservient to government despotism.⁴ The rationale of *gotong royong*, combining rural mutuality patterns with elaborate modern state controls, seems but a continuation of old colonial practices, while the dynamic entrepreneurial forces in the socio-economy, which in the colonial era were gradually given some recognition, are today left without any clear place in the national development process, being forced into increasing dependency upon state assistance and control.

Thus, if the cold war is seen simply as a conflict between the socio-economic rationales of communism and capitalist free enterprise then it is clear that the interests of important social groups in Indonesia are closely identified with each of these rationales. Appeals to ill defined slogans such as *Pantjasila* have little significant effect by comparison. Moreover, the development of tensions between the various island regions in the last few years has given this ideological impact of the cold war a new dimension in Indonesia. These tensions first of all reflect a wide disparity in socio-economic development between Java and the other islands. If we disregard oil for the moment, then more

than 85 per cent of the value of all Indonesian exports originates in Sumatra, Celebes and the small islands surrounding them; while Java consumes nearly 80 per cent of all imports, it produces only about 14 per cent of all exports. A parasitic, overpopulated and overbureaucratized Java, stifling development impulses in the "frontier" regions of other islands, has long been the image which has brought entrepreneurial elements into open conflict with the national government in Djakarta. It is in these dynamic areas beyond Java that an anti-Communist outlook is most often met with, while on Java, as has been indicated, the P.K.I. has grown ever stronger. As a result the recent armed struggle between Djakarta and dissident movements in Sumatra and the Celebes has come to be pictured—not only by the P.K.I.—as a reflection of cold war hostilities in Indonesia, particularly because it is believed that the provincial dissidents, at least at one time, received moral or material support from a number of anti-Communist powers, including the United States. A number of American adventurers, now in confinement in Djakarta for having aided the dissidents, are constant reminders to Indonesians of American "interference" in Indonesia's domestic affairs.

At present, however, the United States seems to look with new favor upon Sukarno, the national government, and even on the new scheme of "guided democracy," which at one time incurred the criticism of the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Under the Constitution of 1945, reestablished by Sukarno's executive decree on July 5, 1959, and concurrently by virtue of the prevailing "state of danger" (martial law), near dictatorial powers now rest with Sukarno and Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister Lt. Gen. A. H. Nasution. Parliament and various advisory councils have now so little power as to allow one to say that national representative government has practically been eliminated, while a controversial new decree has extended the chief executive's powers to include the appointment of the heads of various units of local government.

A steady "depoliticalization" (i.e., compulsory abandonment of political party membership) of higher echelon civil servants is

⁴ Lewis S. Feuer, ed., *Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy* (New York, 1959), p. 450.

designed further to curtail political party influence on the government. This, along with strict supervision over political meetings of any kind, and with tight press censorship exercised by military commanders, has all but made impossible the free formation and articulation of public opinion. Among the major parties two—the anti-Communist Muslim Masjumi, which is the principal center of opposition to the present state of "guided democracy," and the P.K.I., which has steadily become more critical, though at one time in the forefront of those demanding a "return to the Constitution of 1945"—may be seen as the chief critics of the current regime. Two other parties, the Nationalists and the Muslim Scholars' group, by and large favor the government, voicing only intermittent and muted disapproval. The significance of the present, semi-dictatorial construction of government in Indonesia, and the reason, one suspects, why Western powers, including the United States, appear to support it is that given Indonesia's desperate internal and economic difficulties, the present regime may well be the only alternative to further chaos, provincial rebellions, economic collapse and ultimately Communist rule.

Political and Economic Troubles

So considered, Indonesia's future position in the cold war will depend primarily on the government's ability to establish security and to reverse the country's economic decline. Although agreements have been made with some of the provincial dissidents, e.g., in Aceh, North Sumatra, and with Muslim extremists in South Celebes, Nasution has estimated that it will be at least two years before domestic tranquillity can be established, and the various bands of political rebels and just plain marauders erased. Economically, the problems confronting the government are equally formidable. In 1958, import and export volumes were down 35 and 20 per cent respectively from 1957, and Indonesia lost to Malaya her traditional position of being the world's largest natural rubber producer. Rubber production in 1958 was down to 630,000 metric tons from 680,000 in 1957 and, due also to lack of rejuvenation of rubber trees by smallholders, it must be expected that rubber production will con-

tinue to decrease. A petroleum production in 1958–1959 of about 16 million tons showed an increase of about 4 per cent over the previous year, and it now appears that the government will have to rely increasingly on petroleum exports for its foreign earnings.

The already dangerously narrow export base has thus become even narrower: in 1958 oil and petroleum comprised 38 per cent of all exports as compared with 34 per cent for rubber, in 1957 the figures were 33 and 36 per cent respectively. Though rice production in 1958 stood at about 7.6 million metric tons, about 100,000 tons above 1957, it will still be necessary to import at least 700,000 tons annually for the next few years to accommodate Indonesia's burgeoning population. The drain on Indonesia's precious foreign exchange earnings forced by such large rice imports has long been a cause of alarm. Virtually all agricultural exports that were important two decades ago (e.g., tea, coffee, sugar, quinine and fibres) have today dropped by 20 to 45 per cent. Internal instability has exacted a serious monetary toll: in 1958 the government spent more than 17 billion rupiah on security, as compared to 9.8 billion in 1957. Industrial development is stagnating. Sharp import restrictions, also of necessary raw materials, have caused prolonged plant shutdowns. Early in November, 1959, Deputy Minister of Land Communications Djatikusumo announced that 60 per cent of Indonesia's motor vehicles were idle, because spare parts for them had not been imported under the tight import regulations.

On August 14, 1959, Vice Minister of People's Industry Suharto declared that "existing industrial projects, even those which belong to the essential ones, are averaging only 49 per cent of their capacity." Recent deflationary measures taken by the government are still a long way from having restored public confidence in the economy: smuggling, hoarding and blackmarket operations continue intensively, if more covertly. Extreme liquidity difficulties prevail in many sectors of the economy. The government's decision to ban Chinese traders from rural areas and confine them to district and provincial capitals by January 1, 1960, in order to give indigenous Indonesian traders more room for operation has not only caused a

new strain in relations with Peking, but has already disrupted rural retail and credit operations, as Indonesian businessmen and co-operatives lack the capital and organization to step almost overnight into the place of the departing Chinese.

Amid this chaos no party has made such political progress as the P.K.I. Its skillful blend of Marxism and nationalism, its "national front" policy with other major parties, its decisive influence in many labor, youth, veterans' and women's groups, have attracted more than a million hard core members, and in the regional elections of 1957 it polled more than eight million votes, making it, in effect, the dominant party in Java, with growing numbers of followers also in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan. The P.K.I.'s leaders appear at present to be oriented more toward Moscow than toward Peking, but, shrewdly aware of Peking's influence among the Indonesian Chinese, the P.K.I. has opposed the government plan to curtail the trading operations of Chinese retailers in rural areas, although many of these Chinese retailers qualify as "compradore bourgeoisie" in league with landlords and other "feudal elements" which the P.K.I. presumably so bitterly opposes.

The P.K.I.'s *ad hoc* flexibility is, however, its greatest strength. It openly bids for the support of indigenous entrepreneurial and professional elements, as well as of the peasantry and the proletariat. This approach, as the preamble to the P.K.I.'s new Constitution has it, is in line with the establishment in Indonesia of a "Government of People's Democracy," which "is not the dictatorship of the proletariat," but a "dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary classes" (including the Indonesian business groups, the intelligentsia, rural and urban workers, small and "middle" peasants, against the landlords, big foreign entrepreneurs, and their allies).⁵ Above all P.K.I. organizational tactics are designed to create an atmosphere of popular urgency, to lift flagging spirits and to arouse a sense of dedication and austerity. For example, rural party treasuries are supplied by funds collected from "stop smoking" and "left over money" campaigns (i.e. monies saved by giving up cigarettes for one day, or by extra successful bargaining in the market, so that

one has money "left over"). Communist officials display special devotion. Thus, the Communist mayor of the city of Semarang works twice a week for a total of seven hours for free to construct village roads and schools, and he has collected enough money from the sale of empty bottles to build a primary school.⁶

But while these national front tactics attract many different groups, the party has found itself of late increasingly in conflict with the present semi-military dictatorship of Sukarno and Nasution. Communist newspapers along with others have been briefly suspended for opposing the new controversial Presidential decree number six, which gives the executive the authority to appoint heads of local government. After the confiscation of Dutch enterprises in December, 1957, the P.K.I. bitterly opposed the government's policy of allowing these enterprises to revert to private Indonesian businessmen, insisting instead on immediate and total nationalization of all foreign enterprises, including those not as yet taken over. The government, aware of the important revenue producing role of the foreign petroleum companies (e.g. CalTex, Stanvac and Shell), has perpetuated the special tax privileges of these companies, but the P.K.I. insists on their immediate nationalization.

Then there is the question of West Irian (New Guinea), now held by the Dutch, but claimed by Indonesia as part of its national territory. After repeated failures to get the United Nations' Assembly to approve an Indonesian resolution calling for discussions between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the sovereignty status of West New Guinea, the Indonesian government decided earlier in 1959 not to bring the West New Guinea dispute to the attention of the United Nations again. Most parties approved of this move, pointing out that Indonesia needs to better her domestic political and economic conditions before pressing her claim. But the P.K.I. denounced such a policy, embarrassing the government by posing as the ultra-nationalist champion against the "still present enemy of colonialism."

Finally, there is the question of the party's

⁵ Material for the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Djakarta, 1959), pp. 107-108.

⁶ Review of Indonesia (Djakarta), June-July, 1959, p. 7; Far Eastern Economic Review (Hongkong), March 26, 1959, p. 429.

attitude toward the present structure of "guided democracy." The party is not represented in the presidential cabinet (two fellow travelers are), although P.K.I. Central Committee Chairman D. N. Aidit holds a responsible post in the Supreme Advisory Council, and the P.K.I. contingent is one of the largest in the new parliament. Of late the party has become particularly wary of the new role of power of the army, especially of anti-Communist Army Chief Nasution, and it has urged democratic election of army representatives to the new parliament, instead of their appointment as a bloc by Nasution and Sukarno. A widening of the breach between the P.K.I. and the army leadership in the future is, despite P.K.I. claims to the contrary, not unlikely.

Profitable Neutralism

Meanwhile "neutralism" can be made to pay, and Indonesia as a recipient of aid from both the United States and the Soviet bloc is an example of how profitable it can be. Since becoming independent in 1949 Indonesia has received United States aid amounting to \$395,200,000, according to a statement of James C. Baird, former director of I.C.A. activities in Indonesia in late October, 1959. No less than \$215 million of this aid was granted since February, 1956. This aid includes surplus agricultural commodities, Export-Import Bank and Development Loan Funds, and various forms of technical, industrial and educational development assistance. Baird's estimate has been disputed; other sources place the amount of United States aid to Indonesia since 1949 as high as \$485 million. Indonesia's long term debt for 1959 from United States sources alone is estimated at over \$137 million.

In comparison, the U.S.S.R. and its satellites extended aid to Indonesia since 1949 in the amount of \$234 million, including Soviet assistance for various construction projects, e.g., a sheet steel plant and a rolling mill; also ships delivered by Poland, Chinese rice and textiles, Czechoslovakian diesel and farm equipment, diesel buses from Hungary and a sugar plant from East Germany. In addition, bilateral credits exist or were obtained from the Netherlands, West Germany, France, the Colombo Plan powers and others. A new \$30 million credit was ex-

tended in May, 1959, by Peking for the construction of textile plants. Indonesia has attempted to be equally impartial in her recent arms purchases. In the past year, for example, she has ordered or received small arms from the United States, Italy and Denmark, artillery from Sweden, ammunition from Yugoslavia and Pakistan, and military vehicles from Czechoslovakia.

However, the flow of foreign credit to Indonesia over the years has been so steady and plentiful that Indonesian economists are alarmed that the economy cannot stand the agreed-to repayment schedule. Omar Tusin, chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Industry, estimated in May, 1959, that if settlement of the foreign debt takes place according to plan, then no less than 65 per cent of Indonesia's gross national product "merely has the function of paying back foreign credits." Moreover, though some of the foreign aid will have a long range development value, much of it, e.g., United States agricultural commodity arrangements, strike one as stop gap measures, designed merely to stave off imminent disaster in the food and monetary sectors of the Indonesian economy. The United States finds itself continuing such stop gap assistance for fear that to do otherwise would result in domestic upheavals that might bring the Communists decisively to power. At the same time the United States studiously refrains from insisting on necessary fiscal and production reforms for fear that they might be interpreted by oversensitive nationalists as "domestic interference." This is not the least of the quandaries in which the United States finds itself.

Compounding this problem is a new anti-Western cultural xenophobia that has resulted in severe censorship of Western books and pictographic material of an alleged licentious nature, in the banning of "rock and roll" and other forms of Western music, the prohibition of certain Western styles of dancing such as the cha-cha, and so on. The new puritanism is designed to recall Indonesians to their "national identity," and it has already produced one minor international incident involving the United States. On November 2, 1959, the United States cruiser St. Paul visited Indonesia, and as usual various organizations in Djakarta scheduled a dance for the ship's crew. But this time a

minor furor arose, because the Communist and ultra-nationalist press alleged that women, including female students, were being invited to entertain the sailors in a type of "Western dancing," which had been specifically condemned by President Sukarno.

The new xenophobia goes palpably contrary to the extensive Westernization of tastes and values conspicuous among the Indonesian urban population in particular; and since it also extends itself to education and economic life, fields where "foreigners" are likewise to be curtailed in their activities, more than one Indonesian newspaper has echoed the recent editorial warning of the *Indonesian Observer* that the government should be more concerned over the consequences of its present "obsession by anti-foreign feelings." There is no indication, however, that the new campaign of puritanism has made the Communist image any dearer. In the middle of October, 1959, Indonesia was visited by a Soviet Russian mission headed by Nuritdin A. Mukhiddinov,

a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party. Although the Russians distributed gold medals to "popular leaders," denounced Seato, reiterated their support of Indonesia's struggle to gain West Irian and emphasized that the U.S.S.R. "does not interfere" in Indonesian domestic affairs as do the imperialists, the reception of the Soviet visitors was markedly cool. Only the P.K.I. press outdid itself in encomiums. Recently, too, a black market was discovered in American popular phonograph records with headquarters in Singapore and "branches" in many Indonesian cities. As in other parts of the world, jazz has not been the worst of United States ambassadors, especially among the young. Then also, the two thousandth Indonesian to study in the United States under I.C.A. auspices was recently registered. It is on the sympathies of these American trained younger Indonesians that much of the long range efficacy of American cold war planning in this part of the world must ultimately rely.

"We view the problem of balanced growth not only in terms of economic growth but in terms of a balance between economic, social and political development. There has been a general tendency to consider the process of growth of underdeveloped countries as a process aiming at an increase in per capita income and an increase in the rate of capital formation. In our view the development must aim at a change in social and economic structure tending to create a society where each people will have the necessary conditions to fulfill its material, cultural and spiritual needs. . . .

"There has been a general tendency to conceive economic development as a maximum sacrifice of the present in order to build the future. In our concept we think that the process of growth can take place by enlarging the demand as well as the supply and that it is not only important to save but to use the saving in such a way as to necessitate a minimum sacrifice on the part of the population. It is for this reason, contrary to the general tendency in many newly independent Asian countries, that we do not give particular priority to industrialization. Instead we are adopting a process of growth of agricultural development complemented by a progressive industrialization. This is, in our mind, the best way to build the social and economic infra-structure on which we can base our future industrial development and this is the way that leads to the minimum of sacrifice for the best results.

"In view of the available land in our country, the development of agricultural production requires less capital than the development of industrial production. If productivity is considered an important factor in raising the standard of living, then it is relatively less costly for us to catch up with the agricultural productivity. And since our population lacks a fully balanced diet, an improvement in food resulting from an agricultural development has human as well as economic value."

—Vu Van Thai, Director-General of the Budget and Foreign Aid of the Republic of Vietnam, in an address delivered in New York City, October 23, 1959.

Evaluating Seato's record in Southeast Asia, this specialist makes the harsh indictment that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ". . . has failed to catch on as a truly regional organization or as another Nato in the full sense. And it has continued to enjoy the opposition or at least suspicion of many Indians, Burmese and Indonesians."

SEATO and Peace in Southeast Asia

By NORMAN J. PADELFORD

Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

THE SOMNOLENT quiet of the Asian summer was suddenly punctured last August, as if by the thunder and lightning accompanying the onset of the monsoon, by reports of incursions of armed North Vietnamese forces into the northern provinces of the Kingdom of Laos. Amid a flurry of vague reports, rumors and charges, Communist forces appeared to be setting the stage for a new push in Southeast Asia or to overthrow the government of Premier Phoui Sananikone in Laos.

Observers differed on the meaning of this in the jungle hinterlands of Southeast Asia. Some thought it chiefly a local action, sparked by the Pathet Lao Communist elements. Last year these refused to integrate with the Royal Laotian Army now seeking to achieve a coup, with North Vietnam arms, while world attention was turned to Soviet-American flirtations for tempering the Cold War. Others, like Tillman Durdin, *New York Times* correspondent writing from Hong Kong, saw in this a Chinese effort to keep one foot in the door of Great Power af-

fairs; an attempt to cause rumblings in that part of the world so that Premier Khrushchev would not overlook their ambitions in his conversations with President Eisenhower, or to enhance Communist bargaining power either there or in the United Nations when the issue of Chinese membership arose at the United Nations in the fall.

Radio Peking for its part charged the United States with "engineering" the trouble and accused it of seeking to stir up war in Southeast Asia. Other observers saw in the incident a deliberate testing of the Seato machinery now that its principal architect, the late Secretary John Foster Dulles, was removed from the scene. Would Washington and the Seato partners react vigorously? Communist authorities in North Vietnam rushed to their microphones to mimic Peking in accusing Washington, warning Seato to stand aside and declaring that if the dangerous fighting continued Communist Vietnam would not "stand idly by."

The State Department in Washington lost no time in putting its finger on what it believed to be the source of trouble. It accused Red China and North Vietnam of seeking to "keep tensions alive in Southeast Asia." But it added in a press release: "It is still not clear this [tension] is their only motive or whether it is part of a broader Communist design." Moscow hastened to line up with Hanoi and Peking, charging that Laos had permitted the United States to establish a military base there in violation of the neutralization provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreement ending the Indochina war, and demanding the reinstatement of the former International Control Commission which had been responsible for supervising the armistice arrangements.

During World War II and immediately afterward, Norman J. Padelford was an officer of the Department of State and for sometime a special adviser to the Secretary of State. He participated in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences and the London Council of Foreign Ministers. Author of many books including a text entitled *International Politics*, he has been given leave to work at the United Nations on a long-range study of regional arrangements and the United Nations for the M.I.T. Center for International Studies.

Washington vigorously denied that the United States had any military bases or air strips in Laos, that it had sent any heavy or modern equipment to that country, or that there were more than a few military officers there, sent at the request of the Laos and French governments to give technical training to the Laotian army in the use of equipment. The State Department added that Moscow's statement indicated "Soviet complicity in the Communist interference in the internal affairs" of Laos.

Throughout the development of the crisis there was a strange silence on the part of Washington about Seato. Had Secretary Dulles been alive there is little doubt that he would have rushed before the world press to grasp the standard of Seato and issue solemn warnings to Communist aggressors not to trespass in Southeast Asia or to risk massive collective action.

Now quiet concerning Seato prevailed beside the Potomac. Furthermore, rather than staying in Washington to keep a close watch on events or dashing by five o'clock plane for Bangkok, Secretary of State Christian Herter took off for Santiago, Chile, to echo with his colleagues in the meeting of consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the O.A.S. the theme of "non-intervention" in the internal affairs of states in connection with the flurries and plots in the Caribbean. Aside from his subsequent jumping to Europe immediately thereafter with President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter's posture bore little resemblance to the Dulles' policy pattern. Taking a somewhat dim view of developments in Southeast Asia, Herter opined as he left for Europe that the time might be approaching when the situation in Laos should be taken to the United Nations. Premier Sananikone, conning his tea leaves, rushed a messenger to New York to talk with Dag Hammarskjold.

By the last of August and the beginning of September the situation in northern Laos began to take on serious aspects. Reports from Vientiane told of rebel and North Vietnam forces seizing several strongholds and stepping up their military campaign.

British and Soviet diplomats, picking up the roles they held as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference, hustled with talks and proposals. The Soviets wanted to reinvoke the International Commission set up in

1954. Others favored going to the United Nations. But the Government of Laos and Secretary General Hammarskjold finally initiated moves for a Security Council meeting. Only after this had taken action was Seato activated by its members.

Sub-Committee Appointment

The Security Council met on September 7 in response to a request by the Secretary General that it convene urgently to consider a report by him regarding a communication from the Laotian Government charging external interference in its affairs by North Vietnam and threats to its security.

The Secretary General in his Annual Report to the General Assembly had already pointed out that he had noted that the "difficulties" in Laos had reached the point to "call for informal studies and consultations regarding the possibilities open to the Organization to be of assistance, obviously without impairing the Geneva Agreements or interfering with the arrangements which are based on them." But matters had moved since his Report was prepared. Laos had now requested "the assistance" of the United Nations and specifically asked for "an emergency force to halt aggression and to prevent its spreading" to other parts of its country. In his introductory statement to the Council the Secretary General called attention to the fact that this was the first time a specific request of this nature had been addressed to one of the main organs of the United Nations.

At the opening meeting of the Council a draft resolution was introduced by Mr. Lodge, supported by France and the United Kingdom, to appoint a subcommittee consisting of Argentina, Italy, Japan and Tunisia, to examine the statements made before the Security Council concerning Laos, and to conduct "such further inquiries as it may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible." In Mr. Lodge's words it was imperative to get at the facts in the situation, and he appealed to Council members to avoid haggling and hair-splitting on technicalities in establishing the subcommittee.

The discussions soon revealed that the draft resolution had the support of all members of the Council save the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sobolev argued that recourse should be had to the Geneva arrangements and challenged the proposition that the appointment of such a committee could be decided by a procedural vote of any seven members. The question being put whether the action would be a procedural one under Article 29 of the Charter, the Council voted 10 to 1 in the affirmative.

The President's ruling that the appointment of a sub-committee was therefore to be held a matter of procedure and not of substance requiring a majority vote including all of the permanent members was immediately challenged by Mr. Sobolev. Quoting from the Charter and from the Four Power Declaration of June 7, 1945, at San Francisco which ended the deadlock there on the voting provisions, he insisted that the President's ruling was illegal and null and void. In one of the longest wrangles on record in the United Nations on a point of interpretation, Council members argued back and forth as to what portion of the Declaration covered the situation and how it should be construed in this particular case.

At issue was the so-called double-veto under which it has been generally held that when the question of whether an action is of a substantive or procedural nature is raised the matter shall be put to a vote and that vote governed by the unanimity provision. Notwithstanding practice to the contrary since 1946, the other powers held that in this situation the veto was not applicable to the decision. A clause in the San Francisco Declaration mentioned in one place, speaking of matters that would be governed by a procedural vote, that the Council might establish "such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions."

Mr. Sobolev, on the other hand, doggedly maintained that the committee proposed by the United States would in fact be undertaking an "investigation" and that it was precisely such a decision that the Declaration mentioned when it said that any decision that might institute a "chain of events" of a political nature in a matter relating to peace and security was to be subject to the operation of the unanimity rule. In such cases, he held, the appointment of committees or commissions is not the same as for the subsidiary

organs mentioned in Article 29 or covered by Article 27, paragraph 2. When all arguments failed to budge the President from his ruling or convince the United States or Britain and France to change their positions the Soviet delegate warned that the Council had violated its own rules of procedure, the Charter and the San Francisco Declaration. This, he asserted, set a "very dangerous precedent indeed which may have very far-reaching effects upon the future and the future activities of the United Nations." Hence, he proclaimed the whole action was invalid. The resolution was passed by the same vote, 10 to 1.

Thus the protective advance screen of the so-called double veto, which the Soviets had carefully nurtured since 1946 and which the other Powers had generally gone along with, was at least in this instance cut down. This could have important repercussions in later years.

The terms of reference given to the sub-committee were cast in broad language by the sponsors so that the committee might, if it deemed it wise, travel to the Orient to receive further information and conduct an inquiry on the spot. It was no sooner organized than it announced it would depart at once for Laos.

There were others known to be quite unhappy over the course that had been taken. The Indian government in particular, which along with Poland and Canada had been a member of the international commission to supervise the implementation of the Geneva agreements, was strongly of the opinion that the wisest path to take would be to reactivate the commission, get a report on the circumstances from it, and insist upon an observance of the agreements by all parties involved including North Vietnam. But the Laotians felt that the presence of this commission, associated with the period prior to their gaining independence, was incompatible with their sovereignty and they were opposed to it. The Canadians were also opposed to utilizing it. Thus, there appeared little else to do but to go to the United Nations. Many would have been happier, however, had there not been such a crash basis as the convening of a special meeting on Labor Day and pressuring in the questionable form chosen. Some thought a visit by the Secretary General to

Laos, or his sending some member of the Secretariat, would have been the wisest way of inserting a United Nations "presence" into the situation at that point.

When the Security Council subcommittee issued its report on November 5, it found evidence of some Communist support across the Laotian borders in the shape of arms, supplies and staff aid, but no solid proof of "flagrant aggression" by North Vietnam armed forces. Most actions identified appeared to have been of a "guerrilla character" though the subcommittee noted statements that some of the operations "must have had a centralized co-ordination." But it concluded: "The ensemble of information submitted to the Sub-Committee did not clearly establish whether there were crossings of the frontier by regular troops." And it reported that after September 15 the menace had subsided. No recommendations were made to the Security Council.

Thus although there may have been a clear and pressing menace to the independence of the kingdom of Laos in August, it receded to non-alarming proportions by November. With the situation at this stance there appeared to be no point in pressing for immediate Security Council discussion. On the contrary, it appeared at New York that various delegations were working assiduously to avoid this. Behind the scenes members pressed for some other step to keep a United Nations "presence" in the Laotian scene without going through the Council or the Assembly.

Seato Treads Softly

Meeting in Bangkok on September 22, the Seato Military Advisers reviewed the strategic situation as it then existed. Speaking to newsmen, Seato Secretary General Pote Sarasin stated that the organization would be prepared to consider sending armed aid to Laos if its government requested this. Such a request was not forthcoming, however, and the advisers contented themselves with preparing a report for their member governments.

On September 28, a full dress meeting of the Seato Council was convened in Washington by Secretary Herter, in part to give the ministers present an intimate report on the Camp David conversations. Nothing was said before the meeting about meeting

force with force or warning of massive retaliation if hostilities went further. Instead, the emphasis was on quiet talks, reaffirmation of allied unity, and preparation for emergency action should that become necessary. At the close of the meeting the communiqué issued declared that "Certain provisions of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty apply to Laos and particular attention was devoted to the current situation in that country." Affirming their unity in abiding by their treaty commitments the members stated that they would continue to follow the situation closely. At the same time they referred to their membership in the United Nations and supported "the prompt action" of the Security Council.

According to press accounts the Seato conferees discussed the possibility of finding ways and means to maintain a United Nations "presence" in Laos upon the return of the Security Council subcommittee. Although no formal statements were made, it is known that Seato members subsequently used their influence in New York to further this idea in practical ways.

The mild action by Seato is notable for the Laotian situation appeared offhand to involve the kind of threat to peace and security which the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was designed to meet.

The Manila Pact, with its attached Protocol, was, it will be remembered, an American-led response to fears that the Geneva negotiations in 1954 to end the fighting in Indochina would not really stop the thrust of militant communism in Southeast Asia.

The treaty was intended to notify "any potential aggressor" that the parties intend to "stand together in the area" to strengthen the fabric of peace and to coordinate their efforts for collective defense. The core of the pact is the agreement that "aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety." And the members therefore agree that each of them "will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." They further agree that if in the opinion of any of them the "inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence" of

any Party in the treaty area or any of the States especially designated is threatened "in any way other than by armed attack" the parties will consult immediately in order to agree on measures which should be taken.

In view of the fact that the Geneva Agreements forbade the states of Indochina to become members of a Western-originated defense pact, the Seato partners—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States—devised a special means of covering threats that might arise against these non-Communist states. By means of a special Protocol separately signed but attached to the Treaty the parties unanimously agreed to "designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam."

Laos being one of the "designated" states, an armed attack across its borders or an indirect aggression could be regarded as endangering the peace or safety of any or all of the Seato members under the terms of the treaty. But, and this is the essential point, the parties are *not* obligated to take military action, either individually or collectively. They have agreed merely to act as they each see fit and in accordance with their several constitutional processes. This may mean only consultation. It may imply putting a portion of one's own armed forces in a state of alert. It may lead to a concentration of forces at some point. It may result in an accord to employ political or economic rather than military means to restore security or achieve stability. If a formal request for assistance is made by one of the designated states the Seato parties may agree to give all-out support. In no case, and this is germane to the Laotian situation in the fall of 1959, is "defensive action" to be taken by Seato within the territory of one of the designated states unless this is formally requested by the government of that state. In this case no such request was made.

Seato activities are guided by a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers or their designees. This body meets once each year. A corps of Military Advisers assists the Council in addition to a Permanent Working Group of Political Experts, a Committee of Security Experts, a Research Service to keep track of subversive activities. A Secretary

General was appointed in 1958. Joint military training exercises have been held in each of the last several years, but there is no Supreme Commander nor are there allocated forces on the Nato model. Committees of Economic Affairs, and on Information, Cultural, Educational and Labor Activities have been set up in the last couple of years in an effort to broaden the scope of Seato. A Seato engineering school has been established at Bangkok, along with a series of scholarships, research fellowships, and a Seato professorship.

Despite its various efforts, Seato has failed to generate much enthusiasm outside of certain circles in Washington, Bangkok, and to a degree in Australia and New Zealand. It has failed to catch on as a truly regional organization or as another Nato in the full sense. And it has continued to enjoy the opposition or at least suspicion of many Indians, Burmese and Indonesians.

Seato and Laos

The Seato partners technically fulfilled the letter of their pact. The Council met. The Military Advisers met. A close watch was posted on the situation. The Laotians were informed that Seato was standing by if its help were needed. But otherwise it was decided to mark time pending the outcome of United Nations initiative or a worsening of conditions.

Coincidental with the publication of the subcommittee report on Laos the United Nations Secretariat let it be known that Secretary General Hammarskjold had for some time been weighing the idea of making a trip to Southeast Asia to acquire an "independent and full personal knowledge" of the situation there. Such a move was by no means a new thing in the Secretary General's book. He has made numerous journeys to trouble spots of one kind or another since 1955 and to the capitals of member states. These trips have been made on some occasions at the request of one of the other organs, at times on his own initiative. In this instance he let it be known that this would be taken as an "independent step" not connected with the consideration of the matter by any other organ, but only if there were not strenuous objection. His hand was aided by reports of a United States-British preparation of a draft resolution for the Security Council to ap-

point another "subsidiary" organ, by procedural means again, in the form of a permanent corps of observers. This move the Soviets could contemplate only with the greatest distaste after the September action.

Satisfied that the U.S.S.R. would do no more than stand on its past position and enter a rather formalistic demurrer, Secretary General Hammarskjold decided to go to Laos and so announced in November despite rumors of skepticism in some quarters as to the wisdom of such a move into the political arena. Such a step was in line with Mr. Hammarskjold's own philosophy of expanding the role of the United Nations as an instrument for easing international tensions, a point he had already made in his annual report.

In making his own decision, and subsequently summoning an aide to stay on to make an economic survey, the Secretary General was employing an old international institution known as good offices. He was seeking to assist the government of Laos, together with other parties, to extract themselves from a difficult if not dangerous situation. He was endeavoring to insert the element of time to permit various parties, local and far removed, to gain room for maneuver either to fulfill existing international agreements or to negotiate new arrangements. He was in effect taking public attention from the fact that the Security Council was apparently ignoring the report of its subcommittee.

One of Mr. Hammarskjold's first moves in Vientiane was to participate in a press announcement with Premier Phoui Sananikone in which the latter stated that Laos would "remain neutral and not become a base for any foreign power bloc." To this the Secretary added that he knew "all Laos' friends would rejoice at this statement." In short, whether at his instance, but at any rate with his presence, the Secretary General was instrumental in drawing forth a pronouncement of Laos' determination to stand precisely where the Geneva Agreement had placed it. If this was notice to the Seato allies that they would not be asked to send armed forces into the Kingdom of Laos or welcomed if they did, it was also categorically a notice to the Communist bloc that this was territory on which they were not wanted either. Having stated through its delegate

to the United Nations that "it is only the unwavering implementation of the Geneva agreements" that could bring about a normalization in Laos, Moscow could find nothing to oppose in this move of the Secretary General. Furthermore, the act served to remind all that the Geneva agreements had provided for the withdrawal of all North Vietnam forces from Laos. At the same time it was an indirect reminder to the government in Vientiane and to the Pathet Lao forces that had rejected integration into the Laos army that there was homework still to be done within Laos itself.

Hammarskjold's next move, after holding discussions with members of the Laotian government, was to summon Mr. Tuomioja, the Finnish Executive of the European Economic Commission, to Laos to remain there after his departure as his "personal representative" to study and report on what might be done to bring United Nations economic and technical assistance to Laos. The choice of a neutral Scandinavian neighbor of the U.S.S.R. could hardly ring many alarm bells within the Kremlin. To be sure, Moscow had to go through the expected motions of raising a fuss when the Secretary summoned Mr. Tuomioja and said he would remain about a month, the approximate duration of the General Assembly's session. But to say, as the Soviet delegation did, that this could only make "the existing situation still more complicated" was far from kicking over the traces in a way calculated to make a major issue out of it.

Hammarskjold's Achievement

In leaving Laos, the Secretary General gave his representative a broad instruction: to "follow-up discussions initiated by the Secretary General and provide him with such further information as would be of importance for the judgment regarding the assistance he might most appropriately render under the Charter." This could cover many topics, including political questions.

As if again to insure that the rope he walks remains taut, the Secretary General announced on leaving Laos that in making a judgment of what kind of assistance might eventually be supplied to Laos he would take into account not only the provisions of the United Nations Charter but "also other international agreements which provide a

framework for the development of Laos." This could be taken clearly as a reference to the Geneva agreements upon which the Russians have laid such stress.

For the time being a finger has been put into the leaking dike. The breastwork is still standing. Time is gained, for stepping-down the most imminent threats to the Laotian regime, for mobilizing the kinds of assistance that may be most helpful in promoting the growth and stability of the country, and for permitting conversations to take place in quiet corners away from the limelight of heated emotions. Whatever the ultimate outcome of negotiations and moves in the next few months, Hammarskjold's initiative has added another grain of sand to the gradual enlargement of the role of the Secretary General in the functioning of the world organization. This could have considerable effect both on the future of the office and upon Hammarskjold's own fortunes as the holder thereof.

It would be appropriate as a next step for the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East to be asked to give special attention to Laotian economic development. This could conceivably take the form of lending a small team of ECAFE representatives or experts to work with the Vientiane authorities in ways agreeable to them.

United States Policy Reconsidered

By refusing to get unduly heated over the Laotian situation and making blank charges against others or hastily convening Seato and mobilizing armed forces in the Southeast Asian region, Secretary of State Herter avoided springing a Communist trap.

Had the United States allowed itself to resort to the type of blandishments Mr. Dulles was wont to employ on the appearance of threats in Southeast Asia one of several things could easily have happened. Pressure would readily have been aroused to make Laos and United States activities a major issue at the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly. Horrendous charges of imperialism and intervention in the affairs of small states would have been bandied about in the United Nations, in the world press and on the air waves in much the same way as they were at the time of the interven-

tion in Lebanon last year. This would have afforded Communist propagandists an opportunity to distract world attention from their own machinations in other parts of Asia and veiled their internal failures and divisions. Alternatively, precipitous action in Southeast Asia could have sucked the United States step by step into a situation where it would have little to gain and possibly much to lose in Asian eyes while Peking and North Vietnam posed as the defenders of Asian independence.

By staying calm and keeping Seato in the background, albeit at the ready, the United States was able quietly to shore up the Laotian regime, to gain time for diplomatic maneuver, and to avert another fruitless debate in the United Nations. For all the criticisms leveled at him, Secretary Herter has shown himself to be a more astute diplomat than his detractors care to admit. Meanwhile, the United Nations subcommittee's findings have lent credence to Washington estimates that the Laos disturbance was at least in part a ruse or trial move to test the current policies of the new Secretary of State.

The result has been to raise United States stature in Asian minds. Fears that the United States would plunge all of Southeast Asia into a world war by jittery invocation of the Seato alliance have been substantially eased. The United States has appeared as a temperate power at a moment when Red China's armed forces have been engaging in invasion, destruction and occupation of Indian territory. All this has been valuable in stimulating the newly developing cordialities toward the United States in India, Burma and other South Asian lands. In nurturing friendship, but not expecting these nations to become members of Seato or any other military pact short of a major attack upon themselves, the United States is gaining important friendships in one of the most strategic parts of the world.

There will be those who will say that Seato has been slapped down, that an instrument built up with great effort has been sacrificed in the very type of situation for which it was brought into existence. But it must be remembered that statecraft is an art involving the use of many different instrumentalities to meet varying situations and times. What was useful as a crash program five years ago

(Continued on page 109)

In this discussion of Thailand, the author makes the point with clarity and skill that "it is important to remember . . . that though the influence of the Communists in Thailand . . . is presently at a low point and has varied greatly over the past 30 years, . . . the hard, disciplined core of the apparatus . . . has survived and shown remarkable resiliency and ability to continue activities in spite of repeated forays against it by the Thai authorities."

Communist Pressures in Thailand

By EDWIN F. STANTON

United States Ambassador to Thailand, 1949–1953

EARLY CHINESE historical records clearly indicate that the Thai, one of the indigenous peoples of China originally inhabiting the western reaches of the great Yangtze River, stoutly resisted the many expeditions sent against them by successive Chinese Emperors. Thai determination to maintain freedom and independence is implicit in the numerous references to be found in Chinese dynastic annals concerning the Thai people, who under pressure, slowly moved from the Yangtze River to south China during the first six centuries of the Christian era.

In the seventh century, according to these records, six Thai chieftains united and established the Kingdom of Nanchao in what is

today the Chinese province of Yunnan. This Kingdom lasted nearly 600 years, extended its influence into northern Burma and attained a high degree of civilization. It disintegrated in the middle of the thirteenth century before the golden hordes of the renowned Mongol chieftain, Kublai Khan. These pressures resulted in the mass migration of Thai still further to the south. Some followed the Salween River into Burma, others the Mekong River into the area known today as Laos and northern Thailand and still others followed the Black and Red Rivers into northern Vietnam.

The history of the Thai people from the founding of the Kingdom of Sukhotai, which became a mighty state under the celebrated Thai Monarch, Rama Kamhaeng (A.D. 1275–1317), is one of almost continuous struggle to maintain independence. Wars were waged for several centuries against both the Khmers or Cambodians and the Burmese. In 1767, after a prolonged siege, the Burmese captured and destroyed Ayuthia, the capital of the Thai Kingdom at that time. But 20 years later we find that the Thai with undaunted spirit have rallied their forces, driven out the invaders and established a new capital at Bangkok under a new dynasty known as the Chakri, whose Kings have reigned in Thailand from 1782 to the present day. His Majesty, King Phumipol Adulet, the present reigning monarch, is the ninth King of the Chakri dynasty.

History also records the fate of Thailand's neighbors who were swallowed up by the march of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century. The great colonial powers,

Edwin F. Stanton has had a distinguished career in the United States Foreign Service. Prior to World War II, he served with United States legations in Peking, Kalgan, Tientsin, Tsinan, Hankow and Shanghai, China. After World War II, he was assigned to the Department of State as Assistant Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs. From 1946 to 1947, he was Minister to Thailand. In 1948, he was appointed Ambassador and the President's special representative to Burma. A trustee of the China Institute and the Asia Society, he also served as United States delegate to the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 1948–1952. He is the author of *Brief Authority*.

Great Britain and France, annexed Burma, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Thailand found herself under great pressure but succeeded in maintaining her independence by ceding slices of her territory to these powers and by skillfully playing one against the other.

Today, Thailand is the oldest sovereign, independent nation in South Asia due largely to the determination and tenacity with which her people have clung to their freedom. This traditional and altogether admirable national trait should stand the Thai in good stead in meeting and mastering a serious current problem, the threat of Communist subversion.

External Communist Pressures

Relations with the U.S.S.R. date back to 1946, when Thailand was exceedingly anxious to become a member of the United Nations. She was apprehensive, and with good reason, that the Soviet government would block her entry. She received intimations that the price of Soviet acquiescence to her admission would be the rescinding of an anti-Communist law that had been on the Thai statute books since 1933. With some hesitancy the then Thai government explained the situation to the country's National Assembly. Feeling that Thailand's entry into the United Nations was of paramount importance, the Assembly agreed to abrogate the law. Thailand was admitted into the United Nations in 1947 and also established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. In due course, a Soviet diplomatic representative supported by a sizable staff took up residence in Bangkok.

For the next five years, Soviet representatives kept very much to themselves and mixed little with the Thai or with the foreign community. They were not inactive, however, and were known to be endeavoring to strengthen the Communist apparatus in Thailand and to expand propaganda activities through both the Chinese and Thai press. Behind the scenes, they gave active support to the World Peace crusade which made its appearance in Thailand almost simultaneously with extensive campaigns launched in Europe and other Asian countries. For all these purposes, money seemed to be plentiful.

Early in 1952, a noticeable change occurred. Soviet representatives began to mingle freely with Thai and foreigners alike, entertaining with lavish hospitality, wooing Thai intellectuals and students and freely distributing quantities of Soviet cultural books and magazines. Many Thai were impressed, as indeed they had been by the peace campaign, which seemed to conform so admirably to the peaceful concepts of their Buddhist faith. //But in October, 1952, the Thai authorities unearthed a Communist espionage ring involving the sale of military secrets to the Soviets by Thai army and air force officers. The nation was shocked. Many arrests were made and in November anti-Communist legislation with stringent penalties was enacted.

These exposures constituted a setback for the Soviets. The next five years were marked by cautious but determined efforts on their part to regain the confidence of the Thai, and were supported by the issuance of numerous invitations to Thai intellectuals, publishers and politicians to visit the U.S.S.R. In October, 1958, the country was again aroused when the government announced that it had ordered the expulsion of K. Sahalkharo, Press Attaché of the Soviet Embassy, and Y. Trushin, the correspondent in Thailand of *Tass*, the Soviet official news agency. The Thai government's communiqué stated it had definite proof that these Soviet citizens were hiring and using persons in "many circles and occupations to be their tools," to spread communism, to infiltrate labor unions and incite them to create disorders and to attack the administration of the government. These developments were the subject of much sharp and bitter press and other comment. The Communist theme of peaceful co-existence became the butt of the Thai cartoonists and strolling comic actors.

Diplomatic relations were not broken off, but the Thai government watches with a sharper eye the comings and goings of Soviet diplomats and couriers and Soviet activities in Thailand. Today the government more clearly realizes that subversion in many forms has been virtually continuous from the time diplomatic relations were established between the two countries.

Pressures upon Thailand from the other giant, namely Communist China, are even

greater and more serious. Thailand has not yet recognized Communist China but maintains diplomatic relations with the nationalist government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Nevertheless, Red China can and does exert pressures and carry on activities which pose a threat to the country both externally and internally. One has only to glance at a map of Asia to see that the Chinese Communist colossus is very close to Thailand's northern frontiers and dominates Thailand as she does the other countries of South and Southeast Asia. There is fear concerning what this colossus may do because of her bitterness over Thailand's continuing recognition of the Nationalist Government on the island of Taiwan. An open invasion is unlikely, though possible. But the infiltration of Thai guerrillas from south China into north and northeastern Thailand, backed perhaps by "volunteers," is a more likely and menacing prospect.

By way of explanation let me say that in 1953, the Chinese Communists announced with considerable fanfare the formation of a "Thai Autonomous Government" in the Chinese province of Yunnan. The significance of this development lies in the fact that it occurred in an area formerly the home of the Thai peoples for many centuries, where there are still several hundred thousand people of the Thai race and speaking the Thai language. The area has become a center for the training and indoctrination of local Thai, as well as for Thai and Chinese from Thailand. In consequence, the Thai in Thailand are apprehensive and fear that the Communists have fashioned a spearhead of trouble which may well incite Thai against Thai.

Communist China's strongest potential weapon is to be found in the Chinese community residing within Thailand. Not only is this community the largest minority group in Thailand or any other country in Southeast Asia (numbering some three million), but it has for many years occupied a commanding position in the economic life of the country. Red China has not only sought to strengthen and expand the Chinese Communist cells within Thailand, but also to win the allegiance and support of the entire community. It is obvious that the three million Chinese of Thailand (the country's total

population is about (21 million) offer unusual opportunities for dislocating the country's economy and carrying on subversive activities designed to undermine the Thai government. All Chinese in Thailand are by no means pro-Communist, the majority might fairly be described as "sitting on the fence." Nevertheless, the majority regard Communist China with a mixture of respect and apprehension. There is respect, if not pride, for its military strength and industrial and other achievements which within the short period of ten years have made it the most powerful nation in Asia. Likewise, there is apprehension over the Communist government's treatment of their families and relatives still residing within China and over confiscation of land, property and businesses. On these sentiments the Chinese Communists play constantly and subtly.

It is understandable, therefore, that the Thai government does not look forward to the day when it is forced by international developments to recognize Communist China and exchange diplomatic representatives. Indubitably the presence of Chinese Communist diplomatic representatives in Thailand will give impetus to subversive activities and may well pit Chinese against Thai.

Conditions prevailing in some of the neighboring countries constitute pressures which must be noted. The situation in the Kingdom of Laos, which has a common 600-mile frontier with Thailand, is a case in point. Here, dissident Lao elements backed and supplied by the Communists of North Vietnam have for the past five or six years sought by sporadic guerrilla activities, political intrigues and shrewd propaganda to undermine and overthrow the Royal government. The uncertain situation in Laos is a matter of concern to the Thai, as is the fact that numbers of young Vietnamese men from the refugee Vietnamese community residing in northeastern Thailand slip across the border from time to time into Laos and there join the Pathet Lao guerrillas and propaganda teams.

The situation prevailing along the Thailand-Malaya border, quiescent at the moment, also contains seeds of trouble. Along this dense jungle frontier are the hard core remnants of the Chinese guerrillas who have

been fighting the British forces in Malaya for the past twelve years. Presently they are doing little fighting in Malaya and they clash only occasionally with Thai security forces along the border. Nevertheless, they batten on the Chinese residing in southern Thailand by intimidating wealthy merchants and wooing students and laborers. There is no doubt that this highly disciplined and fanatical guerrilla group is strategically placed to create serious trouble in southern Thailand when the time is ripe.

Internal Communist Activities and Pressures

It is of course Communist activities within Thailand that constitute the greatest danger. A Communist cell or cells has existed in Thailand for many years. Indeed it is believed that the first cell was established in 1926, possibly by Ho Chi Minh, present President of Communist North Vietnam. The record shows some activity by this group among students and laborers both before and immediately after the bloodless coup d'état of June 24, 1932. This resulted in the overthrow of the system of absolute monarchy that had prevailed for many centuries and its replacement by a constitutional monarchy. Some of the leaders of the revolution, professing to be alarmed by the Marxist-Socialist views rather popular at the time, succeeded in enacting an anti-Communist law in 1933 which remained in force for 13 years. This drove the Communists underground but by no means stopped their activities among students, laborers and journalists. Certainly, early in 1946 when I arrived in Bangkok, Communist front organizations of many types were exceedingly active and these activities were given further impetus and scope when the Thai Government in November, 1946, rescinded the anti-Communist law in order to secure the acquiescence of the U.S.S.R. to Thailand's admission to the United Nations.

How are the Communists organized in Thailand and how do they operate? These are questions which cannot be fully answered because of the secrecy and tight discipline which shrouds the Communist apparatus all over the world. It is known however, that the hard core consists of a small group of Chinese, the central executive committee. The names and numbers of this committee

are a closely guarded secret and the Thai police in spite of numerous arrests have thus far not caught any members of real importance. Furthermore, it is certain that fairly frequent changes have been made in this élite group. Are there any Thai on the central executive committee? I believe not, although both Moscow and Peking when they refer to the Communist organization in Thailand, always speak of it as the Thai Communist party. There are Thai Communists, as will be described later, and some are of considerable importance, but it is my belief that they have not been admitted to the central executive committee because neither the Chinese or the Russians are sure of their true loyalties.

Does the central executive committee receive its directives from abroad? The evidence is that important policy and propaganda directives emanate from party headquarters both in Moscow and Peking. It is not sure whether such directives are joint or separate but it is believed that since 1950 the primary responsibility for activities in Thailand and all countries in Southeast Asia where there is a sizable Chinese population has by agreement between the U.S.S.R. and China, been assigned to the latter.

Efforts to win the allegiance of the three million Chinese residing in Thailand have followed a familiar pattern with special emphasis on laborers, Chinese associations, journalists and publishers, teachers and students.

Laborers: For over a century Chinese immigrants have constituted 90 per cent of the total labor force in the country, exclusive of farm labor which is almost wholly Thai. Today the labor force working in the country's rice mills, saw mills and other factories, the majority of which are Chinese owned, and in the country's rubber plantations and tin mines, is Chinese. Furthermore, a goodly percentage of the nation's carpenters, masons, tailors and other artisans and skilled laborers, are Chinese. This large labor force, numbering well over half a million, has been assiduously infiltrated by the Communists. Labor unions have been organized, the largest being the Central Labor Union with over 50,000 members, which are dominated by Communist labor leaders. This is also true of many Chinese "trade guilds," al-

though not all have succumbed. The influence exerted by the Communists over Chinese labor is an important factor in the country's economy and in the stability of the government because of the labor disturbances and crippling strikes which could be engineered by the Communist high command.

Chinese Associations: Strenuous efforts have been made to gain control of the many Chinese societies and associations, including benevolent societies, chambers of commerce and influential associations of Chinese originating from particular areas in China such as Swatow, Canton and the island of Hainan. The most powerful and influential organization in Thailand is the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok. It wields immense power over the entire Chinese community in Thailand and all its activities. Furthermore, before formal diplomatic relations were established between the Thai government and the Nationalist Government of China in 1946, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce enjoyed a quasidiplomatic status in that the Thai authorities dealt with it concerning matters affecting Chinese interests. For control of this organization, the Chinese Communists fought a long, bitter battle with the Chinese Nationalists in the community. Between 1948 and 1953, the Communists won many key offices and were in a position to control and direct some of the Chamber's policies and activities. Today their influence in the Chamber is not so great, but could easily expand if the Thai government were forced by a turn in international affairs to extend recognition to Red China. Communist successes in the Chamber of Commerce have been duplicated to some extent by penetration into the two largest residents' organizations, the Teochiu and Hainan Associations and into a number of smaller societies. It should be noted that the present decline of their influence does not mean that it has been eliminated.

The Fourth Estate: Great efforts, sustained by a seemingly inexhaustible flow of money, have been extended to woo and win Chinese journalists and to control the Chinese press and publications. For a number of years (1948-1952) the Communist's principal news organ, the *Ch'uan Min Pao*, and other controlled newspapers and magazines, poured out a massive stream of propaganda which stirred up so much trouble not only

within the Chinese community but also between Chinese residents and the Thai authorities that from time to time the latter have taken restrictive measures against these publications. Such actions, coupled with developments in Communist China, have resulted in a noticeable ebb and flow of Communist propaganda in the Chinese press and its influence upon the Chinese community.

Chinese Schools and Students: Perhaps the greatest successes have been achieved among Chinese students and schools in Thailand. For many years the education of the Chinese has been an explosive issue. The Chinese community has resisted the efforts of the Thai authorities to enforce Thai educational regulations which emphasize the teaching of Thai at the expense of the Chinese language. The Communists were not slow to project themselves into this situation and rapidly became the champions of a "Chinese education for Chinese." They went further, filtering Chinese Communist teachers into Thailand who lost no time in indoctrinating their students and encouraging them to continue their studies in Communist China. As a result, many thousands have left Thailand for China. The Thai authorities have taken somewhat drastic action from time to time against Chinese schools, partly because of the extent to which many have been infiltrated, but more by reason of the fact that they persistently ignore the government's educational regulations, an issue that involves the whole community, whether pro-Communist or pro-Nationalist.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the Communists have endeavored in a sustained and systematic way to win the allegiance and support of the three million Chinese of Thailand during the past ten years. There has been an ebb and flow of influence which, as I have mentioned, can be attributed in part to measures taken by the Thai government and to the internal and external policies and actions of Communist China. It is important to remember, however, that although the influence of the Communists in Thailand is presently at a low point and has varied greatly over the past 30 years, the Chinese group constitutes the hard, disciplined core of the apparatus and has survived and shown remarkable resiliency and ability to continue

active in spite of repeated forays against it by the Thai authorities.

Communist Efforts among the Thai

Peking and Moscow always refer to the Communist organization in Thailand as the "Thai Communist Party." This is in line with the technique of making it appear that such an organization is a wholly indigenous and spontaneous creation. In Thailand, this is particularly important inasmuch as excessive activity on the part of Chinese Communist elements in Thailand has produced adverse reactions among the Thai. Therefore, Thai converts or Thai willing to be used as fronts are eagerly sought, primarily among disgruntled politicians, members of the National Assembly, the armed forces, impudent journalists and restive students. The Communists have had very little success among Thai farmers who constitute 80 per cent of the population and not much success among the Buddhist clergy who wield great influence.

Their successes among Thai politicians are particularly dangerous to the country because whether or not these individuals are convinced and dedicated Communists, they believe that Communist money, propaganda and efficient organizational support can assist them in overthrowing the government and establishing one more to their liking, in which they will receive the recognition and perquisites they seek. These dangers are illustrated by the subversive plot unearthed in 1952 which involved not only disgruntled politicians but some 15 or 20 members of the armed forces, and also by a second plot in 1958 which led to the arrest of five former members of the National Assembly who had spent some time in Red China and five editors of three Thai Leftist newspapers. The most important Thai arrested in this latter round-up, namely Subhachai Srisati, was executed on July 6, 1959, on orders of the present government headed by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The death penalty is so rarely imposed that the government issued a special communiqué setting forth its reasons for the drastic action. The entire document is of interest but the following excerpts shed light on the extent and nature of Thai Communist activities.

As is evident in the announcements of the Revolutionary party [Field Marshal Sarit Than-

arat, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, took over control of the Government in October, 1958, and called his supporters the Revolutionary party], a major objective of the revolution was to stave off the danger threatening the country, particularly the danger of communism which has infiltrated and consolidated its position in Thailand. Communist agents have penetrated many circles and expended an enormous amount of money in engineering disorder to overthrow the Throne, Buddhism and other institutions which have been cherished and maintained at great cost by the Thai nation.

It was after most thorough and conscientious investigation that the police authorities arrested Subhachai Srisati and confederates. The thorough and just questioning that ensued, in which I myself participated, and all the circumstantial evidence, unquestionably pointed to the fact that this group of persons have been carrying on their heinous activities over a long period and have been receiving external support and cooperation. Finally the accused had to confess but still withheld information on the major principles of their activities and on the other members of the ring. In particular, Subhachai Srisati is decidedly a traitor who faithfully carries out foreign directives and holds an important position in the headquarters of the Communist organization. Had he not been arrested he would have successfully engineered intervention by a foreign power in Thailand's affairs.

The execution of this Thai, apparently of considerable importance in the Communist organization in Thailand, is no doubt a severe blow. It is equally clear, however, that the "ring" still exists. If the past is any criterion, we may expect what might be termed a quiescent period to be followed by renewed subversive activity.

Attitude of Government and People

For a good many years the Thai have known something of communism and Communist activities. As we have seen, they were sufficiently concerned over the interest displayed by some elements during the ferment of ideas at the time of the revolution in 1932 to pass an anti-Communist law in 1933. However, the concern at that time and for the next 15 years was primarily over the ideological attraction that Marxist-Socialism seemed to have for certain political and intellectual groups. There was no particular pressure from the U.S.S.R. and not much from the Communist party in China. Therefore, during the years 1946-1950, the

Thai government professed not to be alarmed over the rapidity with which the Communists infiltrated the Chinese press, labor unions, trade guilds, Chinese associations and Chinese schools. They regarded what was taking place as a battle between the Nationalists and Communist groups within the Chinese community in Thailand. They spoke of it as a "Chinese affair" and expressed the belief that there were no Thai Communists.

Nevertheless, the authorities were not blind to the swing of sentiment in favor of Communist China which became so apparent within the Chinese community in 1948-1949. They were annoyed by the blasts which began to be leveled against them by radio Peking in January, 1950. Peking accused the government of mistreating Chinese and of many other crimes, and threatened drastic action if the government did not mend its ways. These developments gave rise to the unpleasant realization that a new and hostile regime had gained control over the vast stretches and teeming population of China. Realization became tinged with apprehension when the Communists unleashed their armies in Korea in the summer of 1950.

The government stepped up its anti-Communist measures from 1950 to 1954, making numerous arrests in November, 1952, in connection with a plot against the government and passing the "Un-Thai Activities Act" on November 13 of that same year. However, its vigilance subsided in mid 1955, partly because of the benign and reasonable stance adopted by Premier Chou En-lai of Red China at the Bandung Conference, partly because of the mellow mood exhibited by Premier Phibul Songgram of Thailand upon his return from a world tour and his relaxation of press censorship and other restrictions, and partly because of the flood of Chinese consumer goods which began to inundate the Thai market to the pleasure and profit of both Chinese and Thai merchants.

This rather relaxed attitude continued until Premier Phibul was ousted in September, 1957, by General Sarit Thanarat, who gave as one of the principal reasons for his coup d'état against his erstwhile leader and friend the necessity to root out the Communists. It was not until October, 1958,

however, that an extensive round-up of both Chinese and Thai Communists and Leftists took place and the sensational expulsion of the Soviet Press attaché and *Tass* newspaper correspondent, occurred. The revelations concerning the subversive activities of the Soviet Embassy stirred the Thai, particularly in Bangkok, as did the further disclosures in June, 1959, of an extensive plot to overthrow the throne and the government by a well organized Thai Communist "ring." These developments have strengthened Thai suspicions of the Communist nations, suspicions heightened by the ruthless Chinese action in Tibet, a Buddhist country like Thailand, by Red China's invasion of Indian frontier territory and by the trouble stirred up in the neighboring Kingdom of Laos by the Communist Vietminh.

Effectiveness of United States Aid

It was my privilege to negotiate and sign both the economic and technical assistance agreement and the military aid agreement concluded between the United States and Thailand in 1950. During the ensuing years the United States has given continuous assistance in such fields as agriculture, irrigation, public health, education, transportation, communications, public administration, industry and mining. The total of such aid over the past nine years is approximately \$100 million, while much more has been expended in the training and equipping of the Thai army, navy, air force and police and in the form of defense support:

The Mutual Security program in Thailand, which has been a modest one in terms of dollars compared with programs in other countries in South Asia and the Far East, was designed to help the Thai help themselves. This called for experts, technicians and teachers who could work with our Thai friends in Thailand and for the training in the United States of Thai students, teachers and government officials.

The Thai are not ungrateful for the help given them. However, like many other recipients of United States aid, they feel that such assistance is motivated by political considerations and is part of our cold war strategy. For this reason and for many others, such as faulty planning on our part, the assignment of American personnel, some of

whom prove to be inefficient or over-bearing, the tendency of such personnel to segregate themselves from the Thai and to take no personal interest in them or their culture, there has been no appreciable strengthening of Thai liking for Americans. No doubt in Thailand, as in other countries, we have expected to much and rather naively believed that aid would "win" us enthusiastic supporters. This is a concept of which we must disabuse ourselves, for genuine friendship and good will cannot be bought.

In view of the foregoing, no surprise will be occasioned by my pointing out that our aid programs in Thailand have had little if any effect upon the ebb and flow of Communist activities and influence described in the preceding paragraphs. Nor have our very considerable psychological warfare efforts been very successful because they were recognized as part of the "American cold war" and were not very convincing. Likewise, our military aid has been designed to equip and train the Thai armed forces in conformity with American military techniques and strategy. There has been too little emphasis on preparing the Thai forces for guerrilla warfare, which is the most likely type of tactics to be employed by the Communists if they should decide to use force against Thailand.

What About Seato?

Has Seato been any more successful in countering subversion in Thailand? The Thai government, particularly the military who dominate the government, are strong supports of Seato and the people, while somewhat less enthusiastic, also believe it to be a protective umbrella. Nevertheless, the fact that Seato has been in existence for five

years; that its numerous committees and large staff of experts have spent much time and money in studying, analyzing and reporting on the subject of subversion; and that in spite of these intensive efforts subversive activities such as those unearthed in Thailand in 1958 and 1959 are still being carried on, would seem to indicate that the answer must be largely negative. The fact is that assistance from other countries is not the answer to subversive activities within a country; subversion can only be effectively countered by the government and the people acting in unison.

A Communist Threat

What should we conclude? Is there a Communist threat to Thailand? I think the answer must be that a threat does exist. As we have seen, the Communist apparatus has existed within the country for over 30 years. Its strength and its influence have waxed and waned as the result of measures taken by the Thai authorities against it from time to time and in consequence of Communist actions and policies elsewhere in the world, particularly in Asia. Nevertheless, the record shows that in spite of the vicissitudes suffered by the Communist party in Thailand, a hard core composed of both Chinese and Thai survives and continues its task of subversion.

The threat does exist, but I believe that today there is greater awareness on the part of the Thai of the danger to their King, their country, their religion and themselves. I do not believe they would submit to a Communist regime if one should be established by some unforeseen turn of events, because love of freedom and independence today are strong elements in the people's consciousness just as they were a thousand years ago.

(Continued from page 101)

is not necessarily equally valid in the more fluid international situation prevailing in 1959-1960.

Seato has been reduced from the position of being the principal arm of United States strategy in Southeast Asia. It has been subordinated to over-all policy considerations. Political means and instrumentalities have been elevated to first place, where they

should be. And sights are being focused on consolidating friendships, promoting economic and social progress, and helping the Asian nations build stronger free societies. Seato is still available as a fire-engine if other means do not suffice. But the United States has made it plain in the Laos situation that the United Nations should take a larger place than it has in the past in the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia.

Received At Our Desk

THE PROPHET UNARMED. TROTSKY: 1921-1929. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Illustrated. 490 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.50.)

From this evaluation of Leon Trotsky's contribution to the Communist cause a picture emerges of the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution in the Soviet Union. In the second volume of his work on Trotsky (a third is anticipated by the author), Deutscher picks up the thread of the story in 1921, when the first signs of peace were restored after "seven years of world war, revolution, civil war, intervention, and war communism. . . ." It was also the year in which some 36 million people died of hunger in Russia.

Deutscher interprets Trotsky as a man of heroic proportions who, following the October Revolution, ". . . began to rise to his height as the revolution's prophet unarmed" and "who, instead of imposing his faith by force, could rely only on the force of his faith." Trotsky, according to the author, was "the man of the state but not of the party." He wanted to be a leader of the people; he placed his faith in the "revolutionary peoples."

The contrast between Stalin and Trotsky is compared to the difference between the ideal of a "workers democracy" versus "the logic of the single-party system." ". . . Stalinism represented an amalgamation of Marxism with all that was primitive and archaically semi-Asiatic in Russia: with the illiteracy and barbarism of the muzhik on the one hand, and the absolutist traditions of the old ruling groups on the other. Against this Trotsky stood for undiluted classical Marxism, in all its intellectual and moral strength and also in all its political weakness—a weakness which resulted from its own incompatibility with Russian backwardness and from the failures of socialism in the

West. In banishing Trotsky, Stalin banished classical Marxism from Russia."

This book provides illuminating insight into the reasons why the Communist, if not the Marxist, revolution succeeded.

ANATOMY OF A MORAL. THE POLITICAL ESSAYS OF MILOVAN DJILAS. Edited by Abraham Rothberg. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 181 pages, \$2.95.)

This collection of essays shows the early gropings which later culminated in Djilas' wider indictment of the Communist party in his book, "The New Class." In "this series of anti-bureaucratic articles," it becomes apparent that Djilas' sensitivity and humanity prevent him from accepting the injustices and excesses of party bureaucracy. He asserts that Yugoslavia has found many of the solutions to its economic problems, yet "social relations lag behind."

He has no argument with "socialism-communism as such, but about democracy and the method, shape and tempo with which it should be realized." Djilas' struggle with communism is not that of the politician, but of the intellectual who sees glaring discrepancies between the Socialist dream and the state's bureaucratic realities. As Djilas himself states in criticizing Stalin, "he established the official 'truth' and 'unity': the worst dictatorship in history. True, he won temporarily, but in doing so he destroyed socialist social relations, although they were still only embryonic. And precisely because it is 'socialist,' our bureaucratism cannot avoid being a little Stalinist, and to some extent, a Yugoslav Stalinism. It therefore stinks of the same ideological odor, and it proclaims the same 'civilized' and 'peace-loving' methods loudly and clearly. These methods, however, are still not directed at those of us who are 'up,' but at those who are down.' "

THE YELLOW WIND. BY WILLIAM STEVENSON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. Illustrated. 424 pages, chronological tables, and index, \$6.00.)

The author, a Canadian reporter, presents with admirable skill his observations on Communist China today. The book is filled with pointed anecdotes woven into the author's solid background knowledge of Chinese history and culture.

Concerned to give the reader an understanding of the Chinese and their customs, whom Stevenson finds ". . . endlessly fascinating, and it would be a thousand pities if the Chinese were to be studied merely as human machinery while the lubrication of their wit and wisdom is forgotten." He himself cannot be accused of this lack. His humor is sharp in addition to being entertaining. Yet it is more than offset by the pessimistic theme which pervades the pages of the book. The author begins with a quotation from the Minister of Communications Chang Po-chun's speech in 1957 that "China is a country of 500,000,000 slaves ruled by a Single God and nine million Puritans." He closes with the warning that "the day may come when the blue boiler suits of China differ little from our obedient men in gray flannel suits."

Also Received . . .

THE OCEAN OF AIR. BY DAVID I. BLUMENSTOCK. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1959. 457 pages with notes and index, \$6.75.)

MEN AND ATOMS. BY WILLIAM L. LAURENCE. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959. 302 pages, \$4.50.)

THEORIES OF HISTORY. BY PATRICK GARDINER. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959. 549 pages with bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

ATOMIC ENERGY IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY ARNOLD KRAMISH. (Stanford University Press, 1959. 232 pages with notes, bibliography and index, \$4.75.)

VOODOO. BY ALFRED MÉTRAUX. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

400 pages with notes, glossary, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

FREEDOM AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA. BY FREDERICK B. PIKE. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. 308 pages with index, \$6.00.)

ADVENTURES OF A BIOGRAPHER. BY CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN. (Boston: Atlantic—Little, Brown, 1959. 235 pages with index, \$4.00.)

STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE. BY BERNARD BRODIE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 423 pages with index, \$6.50.)

THE INCREDIBLE KRUPPS. BY NORBERT MUHLEN. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959. 308 pages with appendix, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

SIR WALTER RALEIGH. BY WILLARD M. WALLACE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 334 pages with appendix, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

AS OTHERS SEE US: THE UNITED STATES THROUGH FOREIGN EYES. EDITED BY FRANZ M. JOSEPH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 360 pages with postscript and appendix, \$6.00.)

CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE. BY PHILIP C. JESSUP and HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. 379 pages with notes and index, \$6.00.)

ALGERIA IN TURMOIL. BY MICHAEL K. CLARK. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 466 pages with bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

THE INCREDIBLE KRUPPS. BY NORBERT MUHLEN. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959. 308 pages with bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

ALASKA, U.S.A. BY HERB and MIRIAM HILSCHER. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1959. 243 pages with index, \$4.50.)

LEADERS OF NEW NATIONS. By LEONARD S. KENWORTHY. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959. 336 pages, \$3.50.)

RADIATION, GENES, AND MAN. By BRUCE WALLACE and TH. DOBZHANSKY. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1959. 205 pages, with glossary and index, \$4.75.)

RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW. By JACK GREENBERG. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 481 pages with appendixes, bibliography, table of cases and index, \$10.00.)

THE FAILURE OF ATOMIC STRATEGY. By F. O. MIKSCHÉ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 224 pages with index, \$4.50.)

THE WAR FOR THE UNION. By ALLAN NEVINS. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. 436 pages with appendix and index, \$7.50.)

BACK TO BERLIN. By V. B. CARLETON. (Boston: Atlantic—Little, Brown, 1959. 309 pages, \$4.50.)

THE WEST IN CRISIS. By JAMES P. WARBURG. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959. 192 pages, \$3.50.)

OUT OF THE JAWS OF VICTORY. By JULES ABELS. (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1959. 336 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.95.)

HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION. By HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 372 pages with notes and index, \$7.00.)

MIDDLE EASTERN CAPITALISM. By A. J. MEYER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 161 pages, with notes and index, \$3.75.)

A SHORT HISTORY OF FRANCE TO THE PRESENT DAY. Edited by J. HAMPDEN JACKSON. (New York: Cam-

bridge University Press, 1959. 222 pages with index, \$3.95.)

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE. By SAMUEL HENDEL. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1959. 594 pages with bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

LIFE IN THE CRYSTAL PALACE. By ALAN HARRINGTON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1959. 263 pages, \$4.50.)

THE RISE AND FALL OF SIR ANTHONY EDEN. By RANDOLPH CHURCHILL. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959. 327 pages with index, \$3.95.)

MONTANA HIGH, WIDE, AND HANDSOME. By JOSEPH KINSEY HOWARD. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. 347 pages with bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

THE CHALLENGE OF THE SPACE SHIP. By ARTHUR C. CLARKE. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. 212 pages, \$3.50.)

HAWAII, U.S.A. By SAMUEL P. WEAVER. (New York: Pageant Press, 1959. 256 pages and index, \$4.00.)

FRANCE, TROUBLED ALLY. De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects. By EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 492 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$5.75.)

TURKEY AND THE WORLD. By ALTEMUR KILIC. Introduction by William O. Douglas. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 211 pages, reference notes, bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

THE HIGH TOWER OF REFUGE. By EDGAR H. S. CHANDLER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. 247 pages, bibliography, appendix and index, \$6.75.)

THE DESPERATE PEOPLE. By FARLEY MOWAT. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959. 296 pages and appendix, \$4.50.)

Current Documents

THE ANTARCTICA PACT

On December 1, 1959, twelve nations agreed that the Continent of Antarctica shall be restricted to scientific and peaceful purposes. All military activities, including nuclear tests, are prohibited; inspection by observer teams from the participating nations is provided to ensure against violations. The full text of this treaty follows:

The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord;

Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica;

Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind;

Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles embodied in the charter of the United Nations;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, *inter alia*, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2. The present treaty shall not prevent

the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.

Article II

Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present treaty.

Article III

1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present treaty, the contracting parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable:

(A) Information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations;

(B) Scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations;

(C) Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available.

2. In implementing this article, every encouragement shall be given to the establishment of cooperative working relations with those specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica.

Article IV

1. Nothing contained in the present treaty shall be interpreted as:

(A) A renunciation by any contracting party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;

(B) A renunciation or diminution by any contracting party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;

(C) Prejudicing the position of any contracting party as regards its recognition or nonrecognition of any other state's right of or claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is in force.

Article V

1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.

2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica.

Article VI

The provisions of the present treaty shall apply to the area south of 60 Degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state under international law with regard to the high seas within that area.

Article VII

1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present treaty, each contracting party whose representatives are entitled to participate in

the meetings referred to in Article IX of the treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the present article. Observers shall be nationals of the contracting parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other contracting party having the right to designate observers and like notice shall be given of the termination of their appointment[s].

2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica.

3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with Paragraph 1 of this article.

4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of the contracting parties having the right to designate observers.

5. Each contracting party shall, at the time when the present treaty enters into force for it, inform the other contracting parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of

(A) All expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory;

(B) All stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and

(C) Any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions prescribed in Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the present treaty.

Article VIII

1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the contracting parties relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designed under Paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under Subparagraph 1 (B) of Article III of the treaty, and members of the

staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the contracting party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.

2. Without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article, and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of Sub-paragraph 1 (E) of Article IX, the contracting parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.

Article IX

1. Representatives of the contracting parties named in the preamble to the present treaty shall meet at the city of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and recommending to their governments measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty, including measures regarding:

- (A) Use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
- (B) Facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
- (C) Facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica;
- (D) Facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the treaty;
- (E) Questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
- (F) Preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.

2. Each contracting party which has become a party to the present treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in Paragraph 1 of the present article, during such time as that contracting party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.

3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the contracting parties participating in the meetings referred to in Paragraph 1 of the present article.

4. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article shall become effective when approved by all contracting parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures.

5. Any or all of the rights established in the present treaty may be exercised as from the date of entry into force of the treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this article.

Article X

Each of the contracting parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present treaty.

Article XI

1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the contracting parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present treaty, those contracting parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

Article XII

1. (A) The present treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in

the meeting provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depositary government has received notice from all such contracting parties that they have ratified it.

(B) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other contracting party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary government. Any such contracting party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of Subparagraph 8 (A) of this article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present treaty on the date of the expiration of such period.

2. (A) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present treaty, any of the contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary government, a conference of all the contracting parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the treaty.

(B) Any modification or amendment to the present treaty which is approved at such a conference by a majority of the contracting parties there represented including a majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX shall be communicated by the depositary government to all the contracting parties immediately after the termination of the conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of the present article.

(C) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the provisions of Subparagraph 1 (A) of this article within a period of two years after the date of its communication to all the contracting parties, any contracting party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to the depositary government of its withdrawal

from the present treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the depositary government.

Article XIII

1. The present treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states. It shall be open for accession by any state which is a member of the United Nations, or by any other state which may be invited to accede to the treaty with the consent of all the contracting parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the treaty.

2. Ratification of or accession to the present treaty shall be effected by each state in accordance with its constitutional processes.

3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary government.

4. The depositary government shall inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto.

5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory states, the present treaty shall enter into force for those states and for states which have deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the treaty shall enter into force for any acceding state upon the deposit of its instrument of accession.

6. The present treaty shall be registered by the depositary government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XIV

The present treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

"... The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized society."

—Franklin Roosevelt, January 6, 1941.

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1959, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month In Review

INTERNATIONAL

Antarctica

Dec. 1—In Washington, 12 nations sign a treaty making Antarctica a preserve for scientific research and barring military activity and nuclear testing. The nations signing are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the U.S. (For the text of this treaty, see pages 113-117 of this issue.)

Berlin Crisis (See *Western Summit Talks.*)

Disarmament

Dec. 14—The Soviet Union offers the U.S. and Britain a "package" compromise solution for 3 of the main stumbling blocks in negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear tests. At the 148th session of the 13-month-old conference, the U.S.S.R. says it will agree to Western proposals on staffing of control posts and voting procedures if the West accepts a Soviet demand that the projected 7-nation control commission be made up of 3 Western countries, 3 Soviet bloc nations and one neutral state.

Dec. 19—After a three-week study, U.S., British and Russian scientists fail to agree on rules for on-site inspection of possible nuclear ban violations.

Dec. 22—The U.S. makes public a study concluding that underground nuclear test explosions cannot be detected by the system now proposed for monitoring a nuclear test ban.

Dec. 28—The U.S.S.R. accepts a Western invitation to resume disarmament talks March 15 in Geneva.

Dec. 29—The U.S. announces that it reserves the right to resume nuclear weapons testing January 1. If tests are scheduled they will be announced in advance.

Nato

Dec. 14—French President Charles de Gaulle says that a formula should be sought for the Atlantic alliance somewhere between integration of forces and a simple coalition.

Dec. 16—U.S. Defense Secretary Gates tells the Nato Council that the U.S. has "present nuclear superiority" over the U.S.S.R. both in weapons and in the means of delivery.

Dec. 17—A communiqué issued at the end of the Nato Council meeting says revival of the economies of Western Europe will help guarantee the "necessary" strength to confront any threat.

United Nations

Dec. 2—Twenty-one Asian and African states ask the U.N. to urge France and the Algerian people to start informal discussions on a cease-fire and self-determination.

Dec. 9—By a vote of 53 to 10, the General Assembly approves a resolution deplored the failure of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary to honor previous U.N. resolutions on the Hungarian situation.

Dec. 12—The General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution under which the U.N. will make a fresh start in efforts to encourage and regulate the peaceful uses of outer space. The resolution, drafted by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., creates a permanent 24-nation outer space committee.

The General Assembly votes to take no action at this time on the Algerian issue.

A compromise agreement is reached ending the East-West deadlock over filling a Security Council vacancy. It is agreed that Poland and Turkey will split a 2-year term, with Poland serving the first year.

Dec. 13—The General Assembly closes its fourteenth session.

Dec. 28—Major General Prem Singh Gyani of India succeeds Canadian Lt. Gen. Burns as commander of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East.

West Europe

Dec. 29—Great Britain and Norway sign a convention establishing a European Free Trade Association, the "Outer Seven." This is part of the second step in implementing the agreement initialled November 20.

Western Summit Talks in Paris

Dec. 20—Meeting in Paris, President Eisenhower, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and French President Charles de Gaulle agree to ask Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to meet with them in Paris during the week of April 25. A series of summit conferences is envisaged.

Dec. 21—at the end of the Paris meeting, a communiqué reveals that Khrushchev has been invited to meet with Eisenhower, Macmillan and de Gaulle in Paris April 27. The Western position on Berlin is reaffirmed.

Dec. 25—Khrushchev accepts the Western invitation to a summit meeting in Paris but asks for a change in date.

Dec. 29—The U.S., Britain and France propose summit talks starting May 16.

Dec. 30—Khrushchev agrees to meet the Western Big Three leaders May 16 in Paris.

ARGENTINA

Dec. 8—Argentina and Brazil agree to mutual defense plans and a common front against subversive activities.

BELGIUM

Belgian Congo

Dec. 3—Three African leaders from the Congo fly to Brussels and demand an immediate high-level conference on the colony's future. They denounce Belgium's plans for ordering elections this month for communal and territorial councils, and urge a postponement until after the scheduled round-table conference in January.

Dec. 4—Brussels denies a request that elections in the Belgian Congo be postponed.

Dec. 5—The Association of the Lower Congo, known as the Abako, major po-

litical party of Leopoldville, maintains its election boycott past the deadline for filing candidacies.

Dec. 16—The Vice-President of the Abako warns that an independent Republic of the Lower Congo may be established January 1 unless the Belgian government announces early general elections for the Congolese Assembly.

Dec. 20—Local elections are held.

Dec. 21—It is reported that the moderate Party of National Progress has been defeated in major cities.

Dec. 25—Five nationalist parties ask for immediate and unconditional independence, at a meeting in Kisantu where a nationalist congress is formulating unified demands.

Dec. 28—King Baudouin arrives in Leopoldville, on a visit to the Congo, and hears shouts for "immediate independence."

Dec. 29—Minister for the Congo August de Schryver says Belgium will grant Congo independence but refuses nationalist demands to schedule Brussels talks January 5 instead of later in the month as planned.

BRAZIL (See also Argentina.)

Dec. 9—Brazil and the Soviet Union agree on a 3-year exchange of products expected to total \$200 million. In exchange for coffee, Brazil will receive oil, equipment for its oil industry and wheat.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH Canada

Dec. 3—Defense Minister George Pearkes confirms that negotiations aimed at arming the Canadian Navy and Air Force with atomic depth charges are under way in Nato.

Dec. 12—Quebec's new Premier, Paul Sauvé, declares that a new policy in provincial-federal fiscal relations is essential if the confederation is to survive.

Ceylon

Dec. 2—A state of emergency, declared September 25 after the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike, is suspended.

Dec. 5—Prime Minister Wijayananda Dahayake dissolves Parliament and schedules new elections for next March to allow the people to choose their government. Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government spokesmen express resentment at

the dissolution, but the Opposition unanimously approves the decision.

Dec. 7—Prime Minister Dahanayake resigns from the ruling Sri Lanka (Freedom) party. He says he intends to form a new party. The resignation comes as party members consider the selection of a party president to succeed Bandaranaike.

Dec. 8—Dahanayake dismisses 5 of his 13 cabinet ministers. Earlier these ministers expelled him from the Sri Lanka party, refusing to accept his resignation.

Dec. 12—Dr. Charles P. de Silva, Minister of Lands and Agriculture, is elected president of the Sri Lanka party. The party's executive committee directs him to see the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, and press his claims for appointment as Prime Minister.

Ghana

Dec. 16—Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah announces that a new constitution may go before Parliament in the first half of 1960 and it may be possible to put it into effect in the first half of this year. The official government newspaper says that the projected constitution will specify the republican form of government with broad executive powers.

Dec. 30—Minister of Transport and Communications Krobo Edusei reveals plans to found border settlements similar to those in Israel.

Great Britain

Dec. 1—Britain and the Soviet Union sign an agreement for the expansion of cultural exchanges.

Dec. 7—The Government easily beats down an attempt in Parliament by the Labor party to censure British policy in the U.N. toward the South African program of apartheid.

Dec. 24—Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod returns from a two-week African tour.

Dec. 29—A contract is signed in London providing that a British company will build two sugar beet factories in the U.S.S.R.

India

Dec. 3—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru calls for the rapid development of a dynamic and "self-generating" Indian economy.

Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, Chief Minister of the state of Andhra, is unanimously elected president of the ruling Indian National Congress party. He succeeds Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Prime Minister Nehru.

Dec. 9—President Eisenhower arrives in India for a four-and-a-half day visit. He and the Prime Minister discuss world tensions, relations with China, India's third 5-Year Plan, and Kashmir.

Dec. 15—The government makes public an account of the "harsh and inhuman" treatment it says 10 members of an Indian police party suffered in Chinese Communist hands in the border area of Ladakh in October. Prime Minister Nehru says an "emphatic protest" was lodged with the Chinese Embassy on December 12.

Dec. 18—India observes "Family Planning Day" to underline the crisis of overpopulation.

Dec. 21—Nehru tells Parliament that he has refused Chou En-Lai's suggestion for a personal meeting at this time.

Pakistan

Dec. 3—The Pakistani U.N. delegation tells the Security Council by letter that it must not allow India and Communist China to carve up Ladakh. Ladakh, a province of Indian-held Kashmir, is claimed by both India and Pakistan, with Chinese troops occupying several thousand square miles of the disputed territory.

Dec. 7—President Eisenhower arrives in Pakistan for a 2-day visit.

The U.S. approves a \$22 million loan for Pakistan for railway development.

Dec. 16—President Mohammed Ayub Khan announces he will appoint a commission in March to recommend a new constitution for Pakistan.

Dec. 30—President Mohammed Ayub Khan reveals that the second five year plan will cost some \$4 billion.

South Africa

Dec. 6—Charles R. Swart, Minister of Justice since 1948, is appointed Governor General of South Africa.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE Cyprus

Dec. 4—Governor Sir Hugh Foot ends the 4-year-old state of emergency.

Dec. 13—Archbishop Makarios is elected President of Cyprus by a 2-to-1 margin. The British crown colony is scheduled to become independent by Feb. 19, 1960.

Dec. 31—A bill is enacted calling for two communal chambers for independent Cyprus: a 20-member Greek communal chamber and a 30-member Turkish chamber. The House of Representatives will have 35 Greek and 15 Turkish Cypriote members. The island will be divided into six constituencies for the first national elections; communities will ballot separately.

Nigeria

Dec. 12—More than 5 million Nigerians go to the polls to vote for members of the Federal House of Representatives. The Northern People's Congress party defeats the other 2 major parties but fails to achieve a majority of seats.

Dec. 15—Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is reappointed Prime Minister. He says that Nigeria will remain in the Commonwealth after achieving freedom next October 1.

Dec. 20—A Cabinet of 17 is named by Federal Prime Minister Balewa. Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the Alliance of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons and the Northern Elements Progressive Union, is not named to a Cabinet post.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Dec. 3—The British Labor party formally refuses to participate in an advisory commission on the future of the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It objects to the refusal of the government to widen the terms of reference to admit any other form of association except federation, and the failure of the Colonial Secretary to release African political detainees.

Dec. 8—Prime Minister Macmillan completes his appointments to the Monckton Commission on Central Africa without any Labor representatives.

Dec. 10—Representatives of the 3 largest African political organizations in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia announce that their members have been instructed

to boycott the Monckton advisory commission.

Singapore

Dec. 1—The Singapore Government announces that Queen Elizabeth has approved the appointment of Yusof Bin Ishak as Singapore's first Malayan-born head of state.

Tanganyika

Dec. 15—Governor Sir Richard Turnbull tells the Legislative Council that Tanganyika will receive internal self-government in 1960.

Dec. 16—Julius K. Nyerere, head of the Tanganyika African National Union, tells the Legislative Council that many features of the proposals for internal self-government are acceptable. But he sharply questions the imposition of literacy and income qualifications upon prospective voters.

Uganda

Dec. 23—A special committee appointed by British Governor Sir Frederick Crawford suggests greater African participation in Uganda's government.

BULGARIA

Dec. 9—The Communist party's Central Committee decides to reshuffle the government by naming 3 new deputy premiers.

Dec. 22—It is reported that Parliament has been informed that Bulgaria failed to meet its 1959 agricultural production schedule by almost two-thirds.

BURMA

Dec. 15—President Win Maung signs a proclamation dissolving both houses of Parliament. General elections will be held within 60 days.

CHINA (Taiwan)

Dec. 19—Chinese Communists shell Quemoy and MIG fighters fly over the island in the first air activity since November, 1958.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

Dec. 4—Henry Pu Yi, former Emperor of China and the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, is pardoned by the government. He and 30 high-ranking former Nationalist military and civil officials captured by the Communists 10 years ago are granted amnesty after they reportedly

promise to work for the Peking regime. Dec. 8—London reports indicate that China has moved up from twenty-second to eleventh place among the world's trading nations in 1950–1958. China's foreign trade in 1958 is reported as 3.1 times greater than in 1950.

Dec. 18—Premier Chou En-lai asks Indian Prime Minister Nehru to meet him December 26 to discuss border difficulties. (See also *British Commonwealth, India*.)

Dec. 24—Foreign Minister Chen Yi asks Indonesia to resume discussions of the treatment of Chinese in Indonesia.

Dec. 31—A dispatch from Peking from the *Hsinhua* News Agency says that the agricultural and industrial goals for 1959 were overachieved.

CUBA

Dec. 1—U.S. officials arrest 5 anti-Castro Cubans in Miami as they are about to load 3 bombs into a rented plane.

Dec. 2—The British House of Lords is told by the Foreign Office Under Secretary that Britain will not sell Cuba the jet fighters it has been seeking in Britain.

Dec. 4—The Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute asserts that he has obtained for Cuba credits of \$100 million in Europe despite U.S. efforts to prevent it.

Dec. 8—Three U.S. citizens are convicted of acts against the Castro government and are sentenced to prison terms of 25 and 30 years.

Dec. 9—The government tightens control of foreign exchange and imports to prevent the outflow of dollars.

Dec. 10—Foreign Minister Roa says his government is willing to discuss with the U.S. the amount of compensation for expropriated American-owned land. U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter says in Washington that Cuba has "rebuffed" efforts to negotiate outstanding issues.

Dec. 15—Major Hubert Matos, a hero of the Cuban revolution and former military head of Camaguey Province, is convicted of counter-revolutionary activities against the Castro government and is sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

Dec. 19—Military executions are resumed in Havana.

Dec. 20—Castro asks Cubans to spy on all

counter-revolutionaries and report them to the police.

Dec. 21—The Government announces that divisions of the National Agrarian Reform Institute and the Ministry of Agriculture will become sole buying and sales agents for minerals produced in Oriente province. This will affect the U.S. Government's Nicaro Nickel plant.

Dec. 22—The Cabinet orders confiscation of the property of all counter-revolutionaries including those who flee to avoid trial.

Dec. 29—Forty-five persons are arrested, charged with conspiracy.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Dec. 4—The U.S. agrees to withdraw its naval mission from the Dominican Republic at the request of the Trujillo government.

Dec. 30—The U.S. State Department asks the Dominican Republic to recall its consul general in Miami; he has pled guilty to charges of attempted bribery of U.S. officials and of conspiracy in arms smuggling.

ECUADOR

Dec. 3—Leftist-led rioting that has lasted for 4 days in Guayaquil subsides with the release of 2 students and an Opposition politician jailed at the start of the disorders.

Dec. 18—Ecuador asks for indefinite postponement of the eleventh Inter-American Conference planned to be held at Quito February 1.

FRANCE

Dec. 2—Government employes stage the biggest and most effective strike since the Gaullist regime was established. The 24-hour walkout affects most public services and government offices and is a protest against the limited pay rises accorded government workers in the 1960 budget.

President Charles de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer conclude 2 days of talks in Paris.

Dec. 15—Following weeks of prolonged discussion, the cabinet agrees to a bill that offers Roman Catholic schools an unspecified amount of money in return for nominal government control to last at least 12 years.

Dec. 24—Voting 427–71, the National As-

sembly approves state financial support for Catholic schools; the provision for government control has been deleted.

After three days of rioting, police reinforcements are sent to restore order in Martinique.

Dec. 28—In Paris, one thousand youngsters demonstrate use of the new franc, (worth 20 cents) to go into effect January 1.

Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville tells the National Assembly that France will consider a common air defense system for West Europe. France still objects to a unified air command, he declares.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Dec. 6—Marking the start of large-scale production of Sahara oil, Premier Michel Debré inaugurates a 400-mile pipeline carrying oil from the desert to the Mediterranean port of Bougie.

Dec. 22—A reorganization of the Algerian Provisional Government is reported in Cairo.

Dec. 25—Leaders of the Provisional Government deny that rebel leadership has changed hands.

Dec. 29—The Cabinet of French Delegate Paul Delouvrier reveals that France plans an expenditure in Algeria of almost \$140 million for industrialization and power development.

Cameroon

Dec. 30—Terrorists riot in Douala in a violent prelude to independence January 1.

FRENCH COMMUNITY, THE Dahomey

Dec. 21—Premier Hubert Maga denies the report by Malagasy President Tsiranana that Dahomey has asked for independence.

Federation of Mali

Dec. 12—President de Gaulle proclaims to a crowd of 10,000 Africans full sovereignty for Mali. Negotiations for the transfer of sovereign powers to the Mali Federation, which unites the autonomous republics of Senegal and Sudan, will take place in Paris at the end of January.

Malagasy Republic

Dec. 20—President Philibert Tsiranana ends

a Paris visit with the announcement that France has agreed to independence for the Malagasy Republic. He says that Dahomey has also asked for independence. (See also *Dahomey*.)

Voltaic Republic

Dec. 30—The Voltaic Democratic Union asks the government to negotiate with France for sovereign status for this republic.

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC (WEST)

Dec. 1—The Social Democratic party joins with Chancellor Adenauer's government to form a united front against Soviet attempts to separate West Berlin from West Germany. The party's executive council recommends that the Bundestag should meet periodically in West Berlin next year to underline that city's attachment to the Federal Republic.

Dec. 3—The Assembly of the Western European Union votes to raise the tonnage limit for West German naval vessels from 3,000 to 5,000 or 6,000. This would permit Bonn to have good-sized destroyers.

Dec. 4—The Refugee Ministry reports that the flow of refugees from East Germany dropped 30 per cent this year.

Dec. 8—Chancellor Adenauer tells his party that Britain and the U.S. will oppose any Soviet move to seat East German advisers at an East-West summit meeting.

Dec. 10—Finance Minister Etzel introduces a national budget running a little more than \$10 billion. A quarter of this is earmarked for defense spending, up 11 per cent over last year.

Dec. 11—Federal authorities announce that a Communist propaganda ring responsible for distributing 10 million pamphlets monthly in West Germany has been smashed with the arrest of 53 persons.

The government tells Douglas Dillon, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, that West Germany will liberalize all but about 1 per cent of its dollar-area trade next year.

Dec. 15—Defense Minister Strauss says that the U.S. has assured Bonn it will maintain powerful military forces in Europe for at least another 5 years.

Dec. 17—The Federal Refugee Ministry reveals that the government has spent \$12

billion for relief to German refugees from East Germany since 1945.

Dec. 19—It is reported in Cairo that West Germany has offered the United Arab Republic some \$48 million to build the second stage of the Aswan Dam.

Dec. 23—Representatives of the Alfred Krupp industries agree to pay up to \$2.38 million to former Jewish slave laborers, who will receive \$1190 per person.

Dec. 25—A Cologne synagogue is desecrated by Swastikas and anti-Semitic signs.

Dec. 26—Adenauer regrets the desecration of the Cologne synagogue.

Dec. 27—Members of the German Reichs party are detained in connection with the Cologne synagogue desecration.

Dec. 30—German authorities reveal various hoodlum acts against synagogues and Roman Catholic churches in West Germany.

Dec. 31—President Heinrich Luebke calls on the West German people to prevent further acts of anti-Semitism.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Dec. 19—Communist party leader Walter Ulbricht scores bureaucrats and blames them in part for the nation-wide food shortage.

GREECE

Dec. 14—President Eisenhower arrives in Athens and receives a tumultuous welcome from 500,000 people.

GUATEMALA

Dec. 5—The Government charges before a special meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States that high Cuban officials are helping "Communist and pro-Communist" groups to prepare an armed invasion of Guatemala.

Dec. 6—Elections are held for 33 of the 66 seats in the unicameral Congress. A combination of Rightist parties wins a substantial working majority in the new legislature.

HAITI

Dec. 17—President Francois Duvalier's fourth Cabinet in his 2-year-old government resigns.

HUNGARY

Dec. 5—The seventh congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers party ends in

Budapest. The congress, the first since the 1956 uprisings, reaffirms its support of Janos Kadar.

Dec. 17—The Soviet Union and Hungary sign a trade agreement providing for two-way trade of about \$500 million in 1960.

Dec. 22—The Budapest radio discloses a 1960 economic plan for Hungary aiming at an 8 per cent rise in industrial production and a 4.9 per cent rise in farm output.

INDONESIA

Dec. 11—Communist China accuses Indonesia of regarding Chinese residents as "nationals of a hostile country" and subjecting them to "most cruel treatment." Peking is protesting a decree that will bar trade in rural areas by Chinese.

Dec. 13—Jakarta formally accuses Peking's diplomats of inciting Chinese aliens to defy presidential regulations.

Dec. 16—President Sukarno proclaims an indefinite extension of a state of war.

Dec. 18—Minister of Defense Abdul Haris Nasution orders government supervision of domestic oil distribution and sales by foreign oil concerns.

Dec. 28—A military trial begins for American pilot Allan L. Pope, accused of flying bombing missions for Indonesian rebels.

IRAN

Dec. 13—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi declares that he wishes the U.S. to strengthen his country's army and air force.

Dec. 14—President Eisenhower, in a 6-hour stop-over in Teheran, addresses the Iranian Parliament.

Dec. 21—The Shah takes his third queen. Military forces are dispatched to the Iraqi border.

IRAQ

Dec. 24—It is reported that Premier Abdul Karim Kassim has charged Iranian imperialists with stirring up aggression against Iraq.

Dec. 27—A technical training agreement between Iraq and the U.S.S.R. is signed in Baghdad.

ISRAEL

Dec. 16—Premier David Ben-Gurion presents a new Socialist-dominated cabinet to the Knesset. The coalition comprises 5 of the 9 parties in the legislature.

Dec. 17—The Knesset approves the new cabinet completed after 6 weeks of complex negotiations following the parliamentary elections November 3.

JAPAN

Dec. 16—Japan's Supreme Court rules that stationing of U.S. forces in the country and the maintenance of Japanese defense units are legal under the post-war constitution.

Dec. 23—The Diet approves a pledge of \$55,600,000 to South Vietnam as a World War II reparations payment.

Dec. 24—The Ministry of Agriculture reports the nation's largest rice crop, some 426,600,000 bushels.

KOREA, NORTH

Dec. 10—More than 300 Koreans leave Japan to be repatriated to North Korea.

Dec. 26—It is reported that North Korea's first Five Year Plan has been abandoned.

LAOS

Dec. 15—Premier Phoui Sananikone announces a cabinet shuffle eliminating all members of a powerful young reform group.

Dec. 18—The National Assembly votes to continue until a national election is held; the tentative date for the election is April 3.

Dec. 30—Premier Phoui Sananikone offers his resignation to the King.

Dec. 31—King Savang Vatthana places Laos under army control, after finally accepting Sananikone's resignation.

MOROCCO (See also U.S. Foreign Policy.)

Dec. 22—President Eisenhower visits Morocco.

NEPAL

Dec. 5—Premier B. P. Koirala declares that Nepal is a friend of both India and Communist China. He makes no direct reference to a statement by Prime Minister Nehru that any aggression against Nepal would be considered aggression against India.

Dec. 26—Three members of Parliament charge that Communist Chinese are massing troops at the northern frontier.

Dec. 30—Home Minister Surya Prasad Upadhyaya denies that Red Chinese troops have crossed Nepal's border.

PARAGUAY

Dec. 12—An invasion by exiles based in Argentina is repulsed.

Dec. 15—President Alfredo Stroessner promises to destroy all revolutionary elements. Exiled groups send telegrams to the O.A.S. and the U.N. protesting reprisal measures against Paraguayans.

Dec. 20—President Stroessner says Cuba aided the rebel invaders.

POLAND

Dec. 6—The Polish Writers Union is told that authors must again submit to strict political controls and be propagandists for the government.

Dec. 12—The government announces that independent peasants may no longer sell meat in public markets unless they have completed compulsory state deliveries.

RUMANIA

Dec. 15—The official Yugoslav news agency reports that the Rumanian government has announced a reorganization of ministries. The ministries of Construction, Construction Material Industries and Timber Industry are abolished; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is split in two.

SPAIN

Dec. 21—President Eisenhower is welcomed warmly in Madrid.

Dec. 26—The Supreme Military Court increases the prison terms for 17 persons accused of trying to foment a general strike.

SWEDEN

Dec. 21—A \$52 million trade agreement with the U.S.S.R. is announced in Stockholm.

SWITZERLAND

Dec. 9—Foreign Minister Max Petitpierre charges that the U.S. has constantly violated its treaty obligations by inducting Swiss citizens into its armed forces.

Dec. 17—Parliament sits in joint session to elect the 7 members of the Federal Council, or Cabinet. After a 6-year absence, the Socialist party re-enters the government with the election of 2 members to the cabinet.

Dec. 21—President Paul Chaudet announces plans to reduce the army from 900,000 to 600,000; the smaller force is to have tremendous firing power. The age limit

for compulsory military training is to be lowered from 60 to 50.

TIBET

Dec. 20—A Tibet Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference is set up in Lhasa.

TUNISIA

Dec. 17—President Eisenhower arrives in Tunis for a 4-hour state visit.

TURKEY

Dec. 6—President Eisenhower arrives in Ankara for a 17-hour stay.

Dec. 18—Thirty persons are arrested for offenses against the national security.

The International Press Institute asks the newspapers of the world to help call attention to a "grave threat to press freedom in Turkey."

Dec. 19—Four Turkish papers appear with blank spaces on page one because a court order forced them to delete mention of the International Press Institute comment on press freedom in Turkey.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *International, Western Summit Talks.*)

Dec. 2—The London Institute of Strategic Studies issues a report saying that the Soviet Union has about 100 principal missile bases and a missile service of about 200,000 men.

Premier Nikita Khrushchev tells Hungarian workers that some of his Kremlin comrades opposed his decision to use Soviet force to defeat the 1956 Hungarian revolt.

Dec. 5—First Deputy Premier Mikoyan indicates in a Mexico City speech that a sharp increase has taken place this year both in the U.S.S.R.'s total foreign trade and in its commerce with the non-Communist world. He says total Soviet foreign commerce will amount to \$10 billion in 1959, with about \$3 billion being trade with non-Communist countries.

Dec. 11—The Soviet Union decrees a new formula for bonuses, with the largest rewards for a decrease in production costs rather than for quantitative output.

Dec. 12—Members of the Communist bloc sign an agreement for convertibility of their national currencies within the bloc. The agreement, covering terms of pay-

ments for imports, is signed in Moscow by the state banks of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Communist China, North Korea, East Germany, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Romania and North Vietnam.

Dec. 13—A reliable Italian news source says that the Soviet Union has lost four astronauts, including a woman, in unsuccessful attempts to put a human into space.

Dec. 14—The twelfth meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid ends in Sofia. The Soviet bloc nations of Eastern Europe write a formal charter for the 10-year-old organization.

Dec. 18—The U.S.S.R. signs an agreement with East Germany and Poland providing for an 186-mile oil pipeline connecting Poland and East Germany with Mozyr. Mozyr will receive oil from the Volga oil fields.

Dec. 19—The U.S.S.R. publishes a note Khrushchev wrote German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer asking for German support of Russian disarmament proposals.

Information about the photographs taken by the Russian lunar rocket is released.

Dec. 22—The U.S.S.R. and Finland sign a \$250 million trade pact for 1960.

Dec. 25—Khrushchev says he will meet the 3 Western leaders in Paris but asks for an April 21 or May 4 meeting to avoid conflict with the Russian May Day holiday.

Dec. 26—The Central Committee of the Communist party orders organizational changes to strengthen party control over collective farms.

A Russian expedition reaches the American base at the South Pole.

Dec. 28—More than 40 U.S. companies in consortium (Intertex International, Inc.) agree to provide machinery for a \$30 million textile plant in the U.S.S.R.

Dec. 29—It is reported from Moscow that at a speech at a party Central Committee meeting, Khrushchev criticized Presidium member Nikolai I. Belyayev for not admitting failures in the farm program of Kazakhstan.

Dec. 30—Tass, Soviet press agency, accuses South Korea of attacking an unarmed Soviet ship in North Korean waters.

Dec. 31—South Korea denies that any of its

ships were responsible for the attack on the Soviet ship.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Dec. 1—Britain and the U.A.R. reestablish diplomatic relations after a 3-year break.

Dec. 12—The government newspaper in Cairo says that the U.A.R. will "fight" if Israel carries out its plan to divert the Jordan River.

Dec. 19—The U.S. agrees to lend the U.A.R. \$12 million to build a television station.

Dec. 22—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development lends \$56.5 million to the Suez Canal Authority to widen and deepen the Canal.

Dec. 30—President Nasser accepts the resignations of 4 Syrian officials, one a Vice-President of the U.A.R., and three Cabinet ministers.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Dec. 9—Agriculture Department officials report that as of November 1 the government's investment in farm surpluses was more than \$9.5 billion.

The Economy

Dec. 22—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the sixth increase in the Consumer Price Index in seven months. Goods and services costing \$10 in 1947-1949 now cost \$12.56.

Dec. 23—The Internal Revenue Service reports that the total adjusted gross personal income reported by Americans for 1958 was \$282 billion, \$1.7 billion more than the same personal income figure for 1957.

Foreign Policy (See also *International, Western Summit Talks.*)

Dec. 2—President Eisenhower says that the U.S. will not use foreign aid funds for the promotion of birth control in underdeveloped countries.

Dec. 3—Telling the nation that his purpose is to acquaint the world with American ideals, the President departs on his journey to 3 continents.

Dec. 4—President Eisenhower arrives in Rome.

Dec. 5—in a joint communiqué at the end of 2 days' conversations, Italian leaders and President Eisenhower agree to follow policies that will ease the arms race.

Dec. 7—Arriving in Ankara, the President

is greeted by hundreds of thousands of cheering Turks.

Dec. 8—President Eisenhower confers with Pakistani leaders in Karachi.

Dec. 9—The President spends 6 hours in Kabul, Afghanistan. He then travels to New Delhi, where he is greeted by hundreds of thousands of cheering Indians.

Dec. 13—Douglas Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, completes a 5-day swing through Western European capitals. He urges early negotiations between Western Europe's 2 great trading blocs to prevent economic and political rivalry.

Dec. 15—President Eisenhower addresses the Greek Chamber of Deputies in Athens.

Dec. 18—President Eisenhower arrives in Paris.

The U.S. Army claims that a Czech consular official is responsible for the attempt to poison personnel of Radio Free Europe, a private American agency. The charge is denied by a Czech official.

Dec. 21—Francis B. Sayre, chairman of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, says that this country's \$4 million pledge to the U.N. for World Refugee Year is insufficient.

In Madrid, President Eisenhower asks the Spanish people to work for peace.

Dec. 22—A joint communiqué by President Eisenhower and Moroccan King Mohamed V after Eisenhower's visit reveals that U.S. forces will leave Morocco by the end of 1963.

It is revealed in Washington that the President and the Department of Defense have refused to give confidential reports on foreign aid programs to the General Accounting Office.

Dec. 23—President Eisenhower returns to Washington.

The State Department reveals that it is trying to mediate in the Iran-Iraq dispute.

In a Christmas message, President Eisenhower urges a dependable long-term foreign aid program.

Dec. 24—The State Department reveals that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will reopen negotiations on the Russian World War II lend-lease debt January 11 in Washington.

Dec. 29—President Eisenhower announces that the U.S. is abandoning its voluntary

ban on nuclear testing January 1. Resumption of testing will be announced in advance.

Dec. 30—Informed diplomatic sources reveal Eisenhower's plans for an early spring trip to four South American countries.

Government

Dec. 2—President Eisenhower indicates he would favor repeal of the non-Communist affidavit required for federal student loans. He says a standard oath of allegiance is "sufficient."

Dec. 3—The Federal Communications Commission directs all radio and television stations to report in sworn statements by January 4 whether they or their employees have accepted any payments for broadcasting plugs for persons or products since November 1, 1958.

Dec. 4—The Federal Trade Commission accuses 3 record manufacturers and 6 independent distributors of deceiving the public and restricting competition by making payoffs to radio and television disk jockeys.

Dec. 7—The Antitrust and Monopoly subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee opens an investigation of the pricing policies of the drug industry and its possible control by a small group of banks and investment companies. It hears testimony that some drug mark-ups have been over 1000 per cent of cost.

The F.C.C. opens hearings on television programming standards.

Dec. 10—The government announces agreement with the drug and poultry industries to halt the production and sale of chickens treated with a cancer-inducing hormone.

Dec. 14—A staff memorandum to the House Special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight charges widespread deceptive practices in the radio and television industry. The report says payoffs and kickbacks in some instances approach extortion.

Dec. 18—William P. Rogers, Attorney General, says that collaboration among broadcasters to prevent abuses will not be restricted by antitrust legislation.

Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Wilbur D. Mills says that over-all tax revision in 1960 is impossible after his five-week study.

Dec. 21—Federal Trade Commission chair-

man Earl W. Kintner says that the F.T.C. will abolish unscrupulous advertising practices.

Labor

Dec. 1—The steel industry says that the contract proposal it made more than 2 weeks ago to the United Steelworkers is its "last offer." The companies put a total value of 30 cents an hour on the offer, which involves a 3-year contract, but union leaders say the value is closer to 22 cents.

Dec. 10—Federal mediators suspend their efforts to effect a mutually satisfactory steel settlement.

Dec. 11—Minnesota's Governor Freeman declares martial law in Albert Lea to halt 2 days of violence at the Wilson & Co. packing plant. National Guardsmen are called in, and the Wilson plant is ordered to halt production.

Dec. 14—Under the Landrum-Griffin law, provisions guaranteeing secret ballots and other democratic election practices in labor unions become effective.

Dec. 15—John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, announces that he will retire early in 1960.

Dec. 18—Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell provides unions whose annual income does not exceed \$20,000 with a single page short form for financial reports. Other unions must report on a detailed nine-page form.

Dec. 19—The United Steelworkers Union agrees on three-year contracts with five aluminum companies.

Dec. 21—The steel industry agrees to negotiate with the Steelworkers on an individual company basis.

Dec. 23—The National Labor Relations Board sets January 11-13 for the government's poll of steelworkers on the latest industry offer.

Dec. 24—The United Steelworkers Union asks a court order forcing a cost-of-living pay rise for January, and making any contract retroactive to November 7.

Dec. 28—The President's Board of Inquiry into the steel dispute finds that no progress has been made.

Dec. 29—Public hearings on the steel strike end.

Dec. 30—Nixon continues to meet with steel industry spokesmen.

Military Policy

Dec. 1—Thomas S. Gates, Jr., is appointed to succeed Neil McElroy as Secretary of Defense.

The Air Force announces it is practically eliminating the B-70 heavy-bomber program.

Dec. 2—The Atomic Energy Commission reports that \$492 million was spent in fiscal 1959 on development and fabrication of atomic weapons, an 11 per cent increase over the preceding year.

Dec. 4—A 7-pound monkey survives a rocket trip 55 miles into space.

Dec. 10—James Douglas, Secretary of the Air Force, is appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense. Dudley C. Sharp is named to succeed Mr. Douglas as Air Secretary.

Dec. 11—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration abandons its Vega rocket program in favor of other space rockets.

Dec. 15—The Air Force claims a world altitude record after a F-104C Starfighter flies to 103,395 feet.

Dec. 16—The Air Force claims a world speed record of 1,520.9 miles an hour for its F-106 Delta Dart jet interceptor.

Politics

Dec. 5—Louisiana voters give Mayor de Lesseps Morrison a heavy plurality in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. In a run-off election, he will face former Governor Jimmie Davis. The candidate backed by Governor Long comes in fourth, and Governor Long, running for Lieutenant Governor, comes in third.

Dec. 12—Opening a 7-day swing through 7 Middle and South Western states, New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller says he will announce his decision on seeking the Republican presidential nomination by January 6.

Dec. 14—The newly elected 60-member national committee of the Communist party chooses Gus Hall as party leader to replace Eugene Dennis.

Dec. 15—A Republican wins an Iowa congressional seat vacated by the death of the Democratic incumbent.

Dec. 19—The Democratic Advisory Council asks the U.S. to maintain its voluntary ban on nuclear test explosions while Geneva talks proceed.

Dec. 22—Senator Wayne Morse agrees to enter the Oregon Democratic presidential primary.

Dec. 26—Nelson Rockefeller withdraws as a possible Republican presidential candidate; his decision is "definite and final." He states that he will not run for the Vice-Presidential candidacy either. Earlier this week, Rockefeller met for talks with Vice-President Nixon.

Dec. 30—Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota announces his availability for the Democratic nomination for the presidency.

Segregation

Dec. 14—The Supreme Court holds unconstitutional the 2 Arkansas laws under which the Little Rock high schools were closed for a year.

Dec. 30—Atlanta's grade-a-year desegregation program wins tentative approval in a federal district court.

Supreme Court

Dec. 7—The Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Administration's ban on travel to Communist China.

Dec. 14—The Supreme Court rules that a bookseller may not be convicted for selling an obscene book unless the prosecution produces proof that the seller knows the book is obscene.

VATICAN, THE

Dec. 6—Pope John XXIII receives President Eisenhower in private audience.

Dec. 8—The Pope calls for laws to curb freedom of the press lest "lust and criminality" poison the religious and moral soundness of mankind.

Dec. 14—Pope John condemns birth control as a means of dealing with the problem of hunger. He suggests improved food supplies and distribution.

VIETNAM, NORTH

Dec. 31—The Hanoi radio reports a new constitution has been adopted.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 25—Parliament approves the 1960 development plan worked out by the government; the plan demands a 14 per cent increase in industrial production and a 20 per cent rise in exports over 1959.

These CURRENT HISTORY issues are available for quantity purchase

Use this check list to order for your classes . . .

Problems in World Affairs

- Communist China's Foreign Policy (12/57)
- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (9/57)
- The World of Islam (6/57)
- France in Africa (2/58)
- West Europe Today and Tomorrow (11/56)
- France's Foreign Policy (5/55)
- Report on Germany (4/56)
- Canada (7/55)
- The Mediterranean World (8/55)
- Great Britain: Education at Mid-Century (9/58)
- The Far East in the Free World (7/56)
- Tensions in American Foreign Policy (3/58)
- Report on Japan (4/58)
- Tensions in the British Community (6/58)
- Russia's Foreign Policy (2/55)
- The Soviet Union since Stalin (1/56)
- Problems of American Foreign Policy (3/56)
- Nationalism in the Middle East (2/59)
- India Between East and West (3/59)
- Tensions in East-Central Europe (4/59)
- France and the Fifth Republic (5/59)
- New States of Africa (7/59)
- Government and Labor Abroad (8/59)

- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Russian Foreign Policy and the Western World (11/59)
- Communist China as a World Power (12/59)
- West Germany as a World Power (1/60)
- South Asia and the Cold War (2/60)
- Latin America in Revolution (coming 3/60)
- U. S. Military Policies in Review (coming 4/60)

Problems of American Democracy

- United States Through Foreign Eyes (12/56)
- Dilemma of Empire (12/55)
- American Farm Leaders (6/55)
- Disarmament and Defense (10/57)
- Changing American Politics (8/56)
- Public Power in the U. S. (5/58)
- Integration: The South's Historic Problem (5/57)
- Education in Crisis (9/55)
- Security in a Free Society (10/55)
- Immigration and the American Ideal (11/55)
- The Changing American South (11/58)
- Government and Labor in the U. S. (9/59)

Our Special Group Rates . . .

Because these studies are so helpful, we are now offering them at special reduced rates for group use:

In orders of 5 or more copies of different issues, copies are available at 65¢ each; in orders of 5 or more copies of the same issue, at 50¢ each; 10 or more of the same issue, at 35 cents; 30 or more of the same issue, at 30¢ each; 100 or more of the same issue, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 85¢. Special discounts on orders over 200.

We also offer reduced rates for student subscriptions: in orders of 10 subscriptions or more, your students may subscribe for 9 months at \$3.15; or for 12 months at \$4.20; in orders of 30 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.70; 12 months, \$3.60; in orders of 100 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.25 and our 12 month rate is \$3.00. The cost of a single subscription is \$5.25 for 9 months; \$7.00 a year. See our special introductory offer on reverse side.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Penna.

CH 260

I understand that I may order copies of these coordinated issues in quantity at special reduced rates. Please send me the issues I have indicated, in the quantities I have marked.

Name

Check enclosed

Bill me

Address

1 Year \$7

2 Years \$13

City State

plus 3 free issues

plus 3 free issues

SOME RECENT CURRENT HISTORY STUDIES

How many of these topics did you mean
to "brush up" on?

Tensions in the British Community	Government and Labor in the U.S.
India	The Changing South
British Education	The Soviet Union
East-Central Europe	Communist China's Foreign Policy
The Underdeveloped Areas	France in Africa
Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy	The Middle East

A subscription to CURRENT HISTORY would have brought you objective, informative background material on ALL these topics and many others, in the past 24 months. In one year, 20 CURRENT HISTORY articles were chosen among the Ten Best Magazine Articles of the Month by the Council of Librarians.

If you subscribe now, you will receive as a free gift three timely and self-contained studies on the topics which interest you most, with your subscription for the next 12 issues at our regular \$7 rate. Please select your 3 *free copies* from our *List of Available Issues* on inside back cover.

*TOPICAL STUDIES turn history into a vital, living key to the issues of the day. Familiar history takes on richer meaning as it illuminates current problems. Each self-contained unit is a timely book-in-brief. Maps and charts illustrate the material.

*CONTINUING REFERENCE is provided by our accurate, chronological listing of important events in every country of the world, by a Document section reprinting treaties, speeches and Supreme Court decisions, by reviews of current books.

IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES FIELD, NO OTHER MAGAZINE IS SO COMPREHENSIVE AND SO CAREFULLY CHECKED.

Our Sources Include . . .

The New York Times, the *London Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, *The Economist*, releases from our State Department and other agencies, from foreign embassies and from the U.N. Documentary material is checked with our State Department, with foreign embassies or the U.N. whenever possible. Maps are checked with specialists in the field, with *The New York Times*, and with the U.N. No detail is too minor.

A GIFT FOR YOU: WORTH \$2.55 CH 260

From CURRENT HISTORY • 1822 Ludlow Street • Phila. 3, Pa.

Your subscription to CURRENT HISTORY will include three co-ordinated studies FREE—chosen from our *List of Available Issues* (see reverse side)—plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your 3 free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover!

Send me the following 3 gift copies:

.....
Name Address

City Zone State

12 months at \$7 plus 3 free 24 months at \$13 plus 3 free issues
issues

Add 25¢ for Canada; 85¢ for foreign, including the Philippines.

Check enclosed

Bill me

MAIL THIS COUPON TODAY!